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INTRODUCTION 
Recent empirical studies by economists have shown, without exception, 
that capital punishment deters crime. Using large data sets that combine 
information from all fifty states over many years, the studies show that, on 
average, an additional execution deters many murders. The studies have re­
ceived much publicity, and death penalty advocates often cite them to show 
that capital punishment is sound policy. 
Indeed, deterrence is the central basis that many policymakers and 
courts cite for capital punishment. For example, President Bush believes that 
capital punishment deters crime and that deterrence is the only valid reason 
for capital punishment. 1 Likewise, the Supreme Court, when it held in its 
landmark 1976 decision that capital punishment was constitutional, cited 
deterrence as one of its main reasons.2 Moreover, the Court confirmed that 
I. In the presidential debate with Al Gore on October 1 7, 2000, Bush was asked, "Do both of 
you believe that the death penalty actually deters crime?" He responded, "I do, it's the only reason to be 
for it . . . .  I don't think you should support the death penalty to seek revenge. I don't think that's right. I 
think the reason to support the death penalty is because it saves other people's lives." Election 2000 
Presidential Debate with Republican Candidate Governor George W. Bush and Democratic Candidate 
Vice President Al Gore (Oct. 1 7, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.debates.orf/pages/ 
trans2000c.html). In the debate, Gore also agreed that capital punishment deterred crime. Id. 
2. In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court provided as a main reason for upholding capital punishment: 
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for 
whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty 
undoubtedly is a significant deterrent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder 
for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes 
the decision to act. And there are some categories of murder, such as murder by a life prisoner, 
where other sanctions may not be adequate. 
428 U.S. 153, 1 85-86 ( 1 976). 
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the main factor that motivated most state legislatures to prescribe capital 
punishment was deterrence.3 Similarly, a central issue in debates on whether 
federal law should include capital punishment is deterrence.4 We can also 
reasonably assume that juries and trial judges, in deciding whether to im­
pose or overturn death sentences, will incorporate common understandings 
about deterrence. Governors may be similarly influenced in making deci­
sions about clemency. 
In contrast to the economic studies, recent studies by sociologists and 
law professors have reached an opposite conclusion. The studies are often 
restricted to a single state or small group of states rather than economists' 
examination of the average for the nation as a whole. They usually find no 
deterrence. Death penalty opponents cite these studies. 
Each group tends to ignore the other's research. In this paper, I reconcile 
the results and show that both conclusions can be correct. 
Using the same large data set of U.S. counties from 1977 to 1 996 that 
many other crime studies use (and that I used in one of my earlier studies), I 
change the focus from national averages for deterrence.5 Instead, I examine 
whether capital punishment's impacts on murder rates differ among states. 
The results are striking. Consider the twenty-seven states where at least 
one execution occurred during the sample period. Executions deter murder 
in only six states. Capital punishment, however, actually increases murder in 
thirteen states, more than twice as many as experience deterrence. In eight 
states, capital punishment has no effect on the murder rate. That is, execu­
tions have a deterrent effect in only twenty-two percent of states. In contrast, 
executions induce additional murders in forty-eight percent of states. In sev­
enty-eight percent of states, executions do not deter murder. 
I then explore why these differences exist among states. After 
investigating various possible explanations, I identify an important factor 
(although other factors are also undoubtedly important): on average, the 
states where capital punishment deters murder execute many more people 
than do the states where capital punishment incites crime or has no effect. 
Using various statistical techniques, I show that a threshold number of 
executions for deterrence exists, which is approximately nine executions 
3. The Court noted: 
The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolu­
tion of which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical 
studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not 
available to the courts. Indeed, many of the post-Furman statutes reflect just such a responsible 
effort to define those crimes and those criminals for which capital punishment is most proba­
bly an effective deterrent. 
Id. at 186 (citations omitted). 
4. For example, when Congress was considering whether to extend the federal death pen­
alty to terrorist acts, I was asked to testify before the House Judiciary Committee about deterrence. 
See Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2934 Before the Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (Apr. 21, 
2004) (written testimony of Joanna M. Shepard), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/ 
pdfs/shepherd042 I 04.pdf. 
5. For a detailed discussion of the data, see infra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
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during the sample period. In states that conducted more executions than the 
threshold, executions, on average, deterred murder. In states that conducted 
fewer executions than the threshold, the average execution increased the 
murder rate or had no effect. 
An intuitive explanation is that each execution has two opposing effects. 
First, the execution creates a brutalization effect: it contributes to creating a 
climate of brutal violence. The execution sets an example of killing to 
avenge grievances, an example that some private individuals then follow. 
Second, the execution creates some deterrence: potential criminals recog­
nize that the state is willing to wield the ultimate penalty. For the first few 
executions, however, the deterrent effect is small. Only if a state executes 
many people does deterrence grow; only then do potential criminals become 
convinced that the state is serious about the punishment, so that the crimi­
nals start to reduce their criminal activity. When the number of executions 
exceeds the threshold, the deterrence effect begins to outweigh the brutaliza­
tion effect. In the seventy-eight percent of states where executions either 
increase murders or have no effect, the brutalization effect either counter­
balances or outweighs the deterrent effect. The deterrent effect outweighs 
the brutalization effect only in six states. 
The results suggest that earlier economic papers' focus on national aver­
ages masked variation among states. Because the six states with deterrence, 
such as Texas, execute many people, the executions in these states deter 
many murders. In contrast, most of the states where executions increase 
murder execute few people. When the large number of executions in the 
deterrence states are averaged in with the small number of executions in all 
of the other states, the large deterrent effect in those states dominates the 
opposite brutalization effect in the other states. Thus the result from earlier 
economics papers: on average, an execution in the United States deters 
crime. This paper shows that these averages are powered by a handful of 
high-execution, high-deterrence states. In most states, capital punishment 
either increases murder or has no effect. 
The results also explain the findings of no deterrence in papers that have 
focused on individual states, rather than on the nation as a whole. As the 
results here show, in seventy-eight percent of states, executions do not deter 
murder. 
All of the primary models' general lessons are consistent across two 
other models that use data from other time periods and with different levels 
of aggregation. 
This Article's results have two important policy implications. First, poli­
cymakers' false beliefs about capital punishment's universal deterrent effect 
may have caused many people to die needlessly. If deterrence is capital pun­
ishment's purpose, as is often stated by our president and others, then, in the 
majority of states where executions do not deter crime, executions kill con­
victs uselessly. Moreover, in the many states where the brutalization effect 
outweighs the deterrent effect, executions not only kill convicts needlessly but 
also induce the additional murders of many innocent people. A very rough 
estimate is that, all told from 1977 to 1996, executions in no-deterrence states 
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have killed more than 5 ,000 innocent people, or 250 per year. Thus, in the 
many states that execute without a deterrent effect, policymakers should 
consider abandoning the death penalty. These states' executions do not deter 
crime. If deterrence is the goal, capital punishment in these states simply 
does not work. Instead, it needlessly kills both convicts and innocents. 
Of course, if policymakers in the no-deterrence states have goals other 
than deterrence, such as retribution, then they might continue capital pun­
ishment, despite the absence of deterrence. In the many states, however, 
where executions not only fail to deter but also cause additional murders of 
innocent people, policymakers might think twice before permitting state­
sponsored revenge that, in effect, kills innocent bystanders. 
Second, suppose that a state was considering whether to start executing 
people. It could not focus only on deterrence, ignoring other important 
moral, legal, and economic issues. The state would need to recognize that 
deterrence cannot be achieved with a half-hearted execution program. 
Unless the state executed enough people to exceed the deterrence threshold, 
then a large risk would exist that the executions would increase murders. 
People in many states may be unwilling to establish such a large execution 
program. 
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. After Part II discusses 
capital punishment's recent history in the United States, Part III reviews the 
conflict in recent studies on capital punishment and deterrence. Part IV ex­
plores differences in states' applications of capital punishment and tests the 
effect on murder of executions in individual states. In Part V, I examine pos­
sible causes of the different effects of executions on murder across states. 
Part VI then offers results from two other models and data sets. Finally, Part 
VII presents conclusions. 
I. THE DEATH PENALTY'S RECENT HISTORY 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
During the first half of the twentieth century, executions were both fre­
quent and popular. More executions occurred during the 1 930s than in any 
other decade in U.S. history, an average of 1 67 executions each year. Al­
though the use of capital punishment declined somewhat in the 1 940s and 
1 950s, executions were still much more frequent than today: approximately 
130 a year in the 1 940s and seventy-five a year during the 1950s, compared 
to an average of forty-eight per year in the 1 990s.6 Over sixty-five percent of 
the U.S. public approved of the death penalty during these decades.7 
In the late 1 950s, however, public support increasingly turned away 
from the death penalty. Various social forces combined to reduce capital 
punishment's popularity and use. Examples include growing doubts about 
6. See DEATH PENALT Y INFORMATION CENTER, HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY, 
PART I (2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid= 15&did=41 O#EarlyandMid­
TwentiethCentury. 
7. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN AMERICA 20 (1991 ). 
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the morality of the death penalty, consciousness that most of western Europe 
had abandoned capital punishment, abatement of the crime wave of the 
1930s, lack of evidence that executions had a deterrent effect, strengthened 
belief in the racially discriminatory use of the death penalty, and increasing 
concern over the arbitrariness of the death penalty's application.8 Public ap­
proval of capital punishment reached its lowest point in 1 966 when only 
forty-two percent of the public supported it.9 Reflecting the public's growing 
disapproval of capital punishment, the number of executions steadily de­
clined throughout the 1 960s, and by 1968, they stopped altogether. 
By the 1 960s, all states with capital punishment laws had changed them 
from the mandatory statutes originally borrowed from English common law 
to discretionary statutes. Under the new statutes, juries had complete control 
over whether a defendant received a death sentence or not. This sentencing 
freedom often caused application of the death penalty to seem arbitrary and 
random. The U.S. Supreme Court began hearing cases involving the discre­
tionary capital statutes in the late 1960s. While the constitutionality of 
capital punishment was being challenged, no states were willing to put peo­
ple to death. 
The Supreme Court finally resolved the constitutionality of discretionary 
capital statutes in three cases in 1 972: Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Geor­
gia, and Branch v. Texas, collectively referred to as the Furman decision.w 
In a five-to-four decision, the justices held that discretionary capital statutes 
resulted in arbitrary sentencing, violating the Eighth Amendment's Cruel 
and Unusual Punishment Clause. This decision effectively voided forty 
states' death penalty statutes and commuted the sentences of over 600 death 
row inmates. 
After Furman, the states quickly began to draft new death penalty laws. 
Although some states passed mandatory capital statutes that the Supreme 
Court soon found unconstitutional, others enacted guided discretion statutes. 
These statutes provided juries with a set of factors they should consider 
when making their death penalty determination. The Supreme Court ap- , 
proved these guided discretion statutes in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia,11 Jurek 
v. Texas, 12 and Proffitt v. Florida, 13 collectively referred to as the Gregg deci­
sion. A major reason for the Court's holding that capital punishment was 
constitutional was its conclusion that capital punishment deterred crime.14 
After the enactment of new, constitutional death penalty statutes, death 
rows quickly filled. The moratorium on executions that began in 1 968 ended 
in January 1977, with the voluntary execution of Gary Gilmore in Utah. As 
8 .  THE DEATH PENALTY I N  AMERICA 25 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982). 
9. PATERNOSTER, supra note 7, at 19. 
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
1 1 .  428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
1 2. 428 U.S. 262 ( 1976). 
13. 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
14. See supra note 2. 
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Figure 1 reveals, the number of annual executions has steadily increased 
since 1977, peaking in 1 999 with ninety-eight executions. Since 1 977, there 
have been 856 executions in thirty-two states. Today, the approval rating for 
the death penalty is over seventy-four percent, after reaching an all-time 
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Despite the recent resurgence in executions, the use of the death penalty 
varies widely across regions. Executions have been concentrated in the 
South for most of this century, and the concentration there has recently be­
come even stronger. Southern states accounted for approximately half of the 
3,859 executions between 1930 and 1 968.16 Of the executions since 1 977, 
over seventy-five percent have occurred in the South. Southern states were 
also, in general, less likely to abolish the death penalty before 1 972 and 
quicker to reinstate it and execute people after 1976. 
In contrast, there has been considerable public disapproval of the death 
penalty in other regions for centuries. Twelve midwestern and northern 
states do not have capital punishment laws, and a number of these states 
legally abolished the death penalty as early as the mid- 1 800s. Although 
other states in these regions have capital punishment laws, several have per­
formed no postmoratorium executions. 
15. Jeffrey M. Jones, Support for the Death Penalty Remains High at 74%; Slight Majority 
Prefers Death Penalty to Life Imprisonment as Punishment for Murder, GALLUP NEWS SERV ICE, 
May 19, 2003, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=23&did=592. 
16. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND THE AMERI­
CAN AGENDA 30 ( 1986). 
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Historians and psychologists offer many potential explanations for the 
differences in capital punishment's popularity between the South and other 
regions: the South's tradition of lynching, Southern evangelical religions, 
the region's prolonged rural/frontier experience, a history of racial 
subjugation, the loss of the Civil War, and a siege mentality that places 
blame on others.17 
II. THE CONFLICT IN PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 
For decades, researchers have reached conflicting conclusions about 
whether capital punishment deters crime. In order to explore the conflict, I 
now describe both the earlier literature and recent research. In later Parts, I 
present results that resolve the conflict. 
A. Early Literature on Capital Punishment 
and Deterrence 
In the United States, whether capital punishment deters crime has been 
debated for decades. The initial participants in the debate were psycholo­
gists and criminologists. Their research was either theoretical or based on 
comparisons of crime patterns in states with and without capital punish­
ment. However, because they did not use multiple-regression statistical 
techniques, the analyses were unable to distinguish the effect on murder of 
capital punishment from the effects of other factors.18 
The debate in the economics literature began with Isaac Ehrlich's two 
papers in 1975 and 1 977.19 Since the 1 960s, economists had been investigat­
ing whether potential criminals, at least on average, rationally responded to 
increased threats of punishment. 20 Economists theorized that potential 
criminals would reduce their criminal activity if the expected costs to them 
of their criminal behavior increased because of increased penalties. Ehrlich 
was the first to use multivariate regression analysis to explore this hypothe­
sis empirically with respect to capital punishment, testing whether the 
number of murders would fall in response to increased imposition of the 
death penalty. In contrast to earlier methods, this approach allowed Ehrlich 
to separate the effects of many different factors on murder. 
1 7. See, e. g . ,  Dov Cohen & Richard E. Nisbett, Self-Protection and the Culture of Honor: 
Explaining Southern Violence, 20 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 55 1 ( 1 994); Richard E. 
Nisbett, Violence and U.S. Regional Culture, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 441 ( 1 993). 
1 8. See, e. g. , H.J. E Y SENCK, CRIME AND PERSONALITY (Paladin 1 970) ( 1964); J. THORSTEN 
SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1 959). 
1 9. Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Addi­
tional Evidence, 85 J. POL. EcoN. 741 ( 1 977); Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 397 ( 1 975). 
20. See, e. g . ,  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 ( 1968). 
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Ehrlich's 1975 paper examined U.S.  time-series data for the period 
1 933-1969. Time-series data are data for one unit (for Ehrlich, for the entire 
U.S.) over several time periods. He tested the effect on national murder rates 
of possible deterrent variables (the probabilities of arrest, conviction, and 
execution), demographic variables (population, fraction of nonwhites, and 
fraction of people age fourteen to twenty-four), economic variables (labor 
force participation, unemployment rate, real per capita permanent income, 
per capita government expenditures, and per capita expenditures on police), 
and a time variable. He found a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the murder rate and execution rate, indicating a deterrent effect: 
more executions meant less crime. Specifically, he estimated that each exe­
cution resulted in approximately seven or eight fewer murders. 
Next, Ehrlich's 1977 paper studied cross-sectional data from the fifty 
states in 1 940 and 1950. Cross-sectional data are data from several units 
(here, the fifty states) for one time period ( 1940 or 1950). That is, instead of 
his first paper's approach of testing how the total U.S. murder rate changed 
across time as the national execution rate changed, Ehrlich now explored the 
relationship during a single year between each of the states' execution rates 
and their murder rates. 
Again, Ehrlich used multivariate regression analysis to separate the ef­
fect on murder of different factors. He included possible deterrent variables 
(probabilities of conviction and execution, median time spent in prison, and 
a "dummy" variable that distinguished executing states from nonexecuting 
states), demographic variables (state population, urban population, percent 
of nonwhites, and percent of people age fifteen to twenty-four and twenty­
five to thirty-four), and economic variables (median family income and per­
cent of families with income below half of the median income). Again, his 
findings indicated a substantial deterrent effect of capital punishment on 
murder. 
Ehrlich's finding loosed a flood of interest in econometric analysis of 
capital punishment and deterrence. The papers that immediately followed 
Ehrlich used his original data ( 1933-1969 national time-series or 1 940 and 
1 950 state-level cross-section) and variants of his econometric model. 
The results were mixed. Many found a deterrent effect of capital 
punishment, but others did not. For example, using Ehrlich's data, studies by 
Yunker, Cloninger, and Ehrlich and Gibbons found a deterrent effect.21 In 
contrast, Bowers and Pierce, Passel and Taylor, and Hoenack and Weiler 
found no deterrence when they used the same data with alternative 
specifications.22 Similarly, McAleer and Veall, Leamer, and McManus found 
2 1 .  Dale 0. Cloninger, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 6 1. 
BEHAV. EcoN. 87, 98 ( 1977); Isaac Ehrlich & Joel Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent 
Effect of Capital Punishment and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 1. LEGAL STUD. 35 ( 1 977); James A. 
Yunker, Is the Death Penalty a Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5 1. BEHAV. 
ECON. 45 ( 1 976). 
22. William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's 
Research on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.1. 1 87 ( 1 975); Stephen A. Hoenack & William C. 
Weiler, A Structural Model of Murder Behavior and the Criminal Justice System, 70 AM. EcoN. 
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no deterrent effect when different variables were included over the same 
sample period.23 Finally, Black and Orsagh found mixed results depending 
on the cross-section year they used.24 
In the late 1980s and 1990s, a second generation of econometric studies 
extended Ehrlich's national time-series data or used more recent cross­
sectional data. As before, some papers found deterrence while others did 
not. For example, Cover and Thistle and Layson used an extension of 
Ehrlich's national time-series data, covering up to 1977. 25 Although Layson 
found a significant deterrent effect of executions, Cover and Thistle cor­
rected for data flaws and found no deterrent effect. Chressanthis employed 
national time-series data covering 1 966 through 1985 and found a deterrent 
effect.26 In contrast, Grogger used daily data for California during 1960--
1 963 and found no deterrent effect.27 
Most of the early studies-both the first wave and the second genera­
tion-suffered from basic flaws: they suffered important data limitations 
because they used either national time-series or cross-section data. Using 
national time-series data created a serious aggregation problem. Any deter­
rence from an execution should affect the crime rate only in the executing 
state; one state's high execution rate would not be expected to change the 
crime rate in nearby states, where the first state's laws and execution pro­
clivity do not apply. 
Aggregation-lumping all states together in a national time series­
diluted such distinct effects, creating "aggregation bias." For example, sup­
pose that the following happened concurrently: the murder rate in a state 
with no executions randomly increased at the same time that the murder rate 
dropped in a state with many executions. Aggregate data might incorrectly 
lead to an inference of no deterrence; the aggregate data, with the two states 
lumped together, would show an increase in executions leading to no change 
in the murder rate. 
Cross-sectional studies also suffer serious problems. Most importantly, 
they prevent researchers from using so-called "fixed-effects estimation" to 
control for jurisdiction-specific characteristics that could be related to mur-
REV. 327 ( 1980); Peter Passell & John B. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An­
other View, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 445 ( 1977). 
23. Edward E. Leamer, Let's Take the Con out of Econometrics, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 3 1  
( 1 983); Michael McAleer & Michael R. Veall, How Fragile are Fragile Inferences? A Re-Evaluation 
of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 7 1  REV. EcoN. & STAT. 99 (1989); Walter S. 
McManus, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: The Importance of the Re­
searcher's Prior Beliefs, 93 J. PoL. EcoN. 4 1 7  ( 1985). 
24. Theodore Black & Thomas Orsagh, New Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a 
Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 616  ( 1978). 
25. James Peery Cover & Paul D. Thistle, Time Series, Homicide, and the Deterrent Effect of 
Capital Punishment, 54 S.  EcoN. J. 6 1 5  ( 1 988); Stephen K. Layson, Homicide and Deterrence: A 
Reexamination of the United States Time-Series Evidence, 52 S. EcoN. 1. 68 ( 1985). 
26. George A. Chressanthis, Capital Punishment and the Deterrent Effect Revisited: Recent 
Time-Series Econometric Evidence, 1 8  J. BEHAV. EcoN. 8 1  ( 1 989). 
27. Jeffrey Grogger, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily 
Homicide Counts,.85 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 295 (1 990). 
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der. For example, with cross-section data, a researcher cannot control for 
fundamental but immeasurable variables, such as a violent culture in certain 
states.28 Cross-section data also preclude any consideration of what happens 
to crime, law enforcement, and judicial processes over time. 
Moreover, both time-series and cross-section data shared the problem of 
having few observations. For example, for the year analyzed, Ehrlich's na­
tional time-series data had only thirty-seven observations and his cross­
section data had only fifty observations. With so few observations, strong 
statistical conclusions are impossible. 
Noting the inadequacy of time-series and cross-section data, several au­
thors called for new research using panel data, an approach that I describe 
below.29 In addition, a National Academy of Sciences panel convened to 
study the early deterrence literature. It concluded that new research should 
be conducted with disaggregated data that looked at smaller geographic 
units, such as counties or cities rather than the nation as a whole, and 
smaller time periods, such as months rather than years. The panel also sug­
gested that new studies examine the impact of executions on different types 
of homicides.30 
Researchers responded to the invitation. In addition to using panel data, 
several new studies employ disaggregated data of the sort recommended by 
the panel. Likewise, another study examined executions' impacts on differ­
ent homicide types. I now discuss these modern studies of the past decade. 
B .  Modern Studies of Capital Punishment's 
Deterrent Effect 
Most recent studies have overcome the fundamental problems associated 
with national time-series and cross-section data by using panel data tech­
niques. "Panel data" are data from several units (the fifty states or all U.S. 
counties) over several different time periods. That is, panel data follow a 
cross-section over time. For example, a panel dataset might include data on 
each of the fifty states, or even on each U.S.  county, for a series of years. 
Panel data produce many more observations than cross-section or time­
series data. For example, a state-level, panel data set of fifty states over ten 
years would have 500 observations. By contrast, a national, time-series data 
set over the same period would have only ten observations and a state-level, 
cross-section data set from one of the years would have only fifty 
28. Technically, cross-sectional studies are affected by unobserved heterogeneity that cannot 
be controlled for in the absence of time variation. The heterogeneity is caused by jurisdiction­
specific characteristics that may correlate with other variables of the model, resulting in biased, 
incorrect estimates. 
29. See, e.g., K.L. Avio, Capita[ Punishment, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
EcoNOMICS AND THE LAW 205 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Samuel Cameron, A Review of the 
Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Capital Punishment, 23 J. Soc10-EcoN. 1 97 ( 1 994). 
30. See NAT'L. ACAD. SCI., Report of the Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative 
Effects, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: E STIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
ON CRIME RATES I (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978). 
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observations. Through inexorable statistical laws, more observations permit 
more accurate measurement of the capital punishment's impacts. 
Furthermore, panel data allow researchers to control for important juris­
dictional differences among U.S. states or counties by using fixed-effects 
estimation (which cross-section data cannot do), while avoiding aggregation 
bias (a problem of time-series data). Several studies have analyzed data that 
are more disaggregated than in the early studies. This minimizes aggrega­
tion bias over geographic units or periods of time, enabling researchers to 
estimate any deterrent effect more precisely. In addition to enjoying the 
benefits of panel data, recent studies have access to more recent data that 
make conclusions more relevant for the current environment. 
In the past decade, eight papers have been written in the economics lit­
erature that use improved panel data and more sophisticated regression 
techniques. Their conclusion is unanimous: all of the modern economics 
papers find evidence of deterrence. Four other papers in the past decade 
have not used panel data, but also find a deterrent effect. Several studies, 
however, in sociology journals and law reviews have produced mixed re­
sults; some find deterrence while others do not. 
1 .  Modern Economics Papers Using 
Panel-Data Techniques 
All of the modern papers that use panel-data analysis find a deterrent ef­
fect. 
i .  Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, and I examined whether 
deterrence existed using county-level panel data from 3,054 U.S. counties 
over the period 1 977-1996.31 This is the only study to use county-level data, 
allowing us to estimate better the demographic, economic, and jurisdictional 
differences among U.S. counties that can affect murder rates. Moreover, the 
large number of county-level observations extended the empirical tests' 
reliability.32 We found a substantial deterrent effect; both death row 
sentences and the executions themselves resulted in decreases in the murder 
rate. Our conservative estimate was that each execution results in, on 
average, eighteen fewer murders. Our main finding, that capital punishment 
has a deterrent effect, was consistent across many different ways of 
performing the statistical analysis.33 
ii. In another paper, I used state-level, monthly panel data from 1 977 to 
1 999 to examine two gaps in the capital punishment literature.34 First, I in-
3 1 .  Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New 
Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. LAW & EcoN. REV. 344 (2003). 
32. Technically, it extends the analysis' degrees of freedom, increases variability, and re­
duces colinearity among variables. 
33. The deterrent effect remains with different choices of functional form (double-log, semi­
log, or linear), state-level vs. county-level analysis, sampling period, endogenous vs. exogenous 
probabilities, and level vs. ratio specification of the main variables. 
34. Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of Capi­
tal Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004). 
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vestigated the types of murders deterred by capital punishment. Some peo­
ple believe that certain types of murder are not deterrable.35 To the contrary, 
I found that the combination of death row sentences and executions deterred 
all types of murders: murders between intimates, acquaintances, and strang­
ers, crime-of-passion murders and murders committed during other felonies, 
and murders of African American and white people.36 I estimated that each 
death row sentence deters approximately 4.5 murders and that each execu­
tion deterred approximately three murders. 
The second issue that the paper addressed is the impact on deterrence of 
execution delays. In 1 996, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 that limits federal habeas review in capital cases. 
If criminals prefer lengthy death row waits to short ones, as their numerous 
appeals and requests for stays suggest, then shortening the time until execu­
tion could increase the death penalty's deterrent impact. I found that shorter 
waits on death row increased deterrence. Specifically, one extra murder is 
deterred for every 2.75-years reduction in the death row wait before each 
execution. 
iii. Hashem Dezhbakhsh and I used state-level panel data from 1960 to 
2000 to examine capital punishment's deterrent effect.37 This was the only 
study to use data from before, during, and after the 1972-1976 Supreme 
Court moratorium on executions. Our study advanced the deterrence litera­
ture by exploiting an important characteristic that other studies overlooked: 
the experimental nature of the Supreme Court moratorium. 
First, we performed before-and-after moratorium comparisons. Specifi­
cally, we compared the murder rate for each state immediately before and 
after it suspended or reinstated the death penalty. These before-and-after 
comparisons were informative because many factors that affected crime­
for example, law enforcement, judicial, demographic, and economic vari­
ables-changed only slightly over a short period of time. In addition, the 
moratorium began and ended in different years in different states. Consider­
ing the different start and end dates, the duration of the moratorium varied 
considerably across states, ranging from four to thirty years. Observing 
similar changes in murder rates immediately after the same legal change in 
different years and in various states provided compelling evidence of the 
moratorium's effect on murder. The before-and-after comparisons revealed 
that about ninety-one percent of states experienced an increase in murder 
35. They claim that murders by intimates or crimes of passion are products of uncontrollable 
rage, and they are therefore nondeterrable. Others even argue executions could even increase the 
number of murders by strangers, as the brutality of executions incites criminals. 
36. Intimates are defined as spouses, common-law spouses, parents, children, siblings, in­
laws, step-relations, and other family. Crime-of-passion murders include lovers' triangles, murders 
by babysitters, brawls under alcohol, brawls under drugs, arguments over money, other arguments, 
and abortion-murders (abortions performed during the murder of the mother). 
37. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish­
ment: Evidence from a 'Judicial Experiment,' (Emory Univ., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 04-04, 2004). 
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rates after they suspended the death penalty. In about seventy percent of the 
cases, the murder rate dropped after the state reinstated the death penalty. 
We supplemented the before-and-after comparisons with time-series and 
panel-data regression analyses that, unlike many existing studies, used both 
pre- and postmoratorium data. The regressions disentangled the impact of 
the moratorium itself on murder from the effect of actual executions on 
murder; we found that the moratorium had a significant positive effect on 
murder and that executions had significant negative effects on murder. These 
estimates suggested that both adopting a capital statute and exercising it 
h a D ave strong deterrent euects. 
iv. John R. Lott, Jr. and William M. Landes used state-level panel data 
from 1977 to 1 995 to examine whether right-to-carry concealed handgun 
laws deterred multiple-victim public shootings.39 Included in their analysis 
were tests of the deterrent effect of executions on murder. The authors found 
that right-to-carry concealed handgun laws do result in fewer multiple vic­
tim public shootings. They also found that executions have a significant 
deterrent effect on the overall murder rate. Specifically, a one percent in­
crease in the execution rate was associated with a seven percent decline in 
the overall murder rate. 
v. and vi. Two papers by FCC economist Paul Zimmerman found a de­
terrent effect.40 In his first paper, Zimmerman used state-level panel data 
from 1 978 to 1 997 to examine the relationship between state execution rates 
and murder rates. In his second paper, he employed state-level panel data 
from 1 978 to 2000 to examine which execution methods had the strongest 
deterrent effects. In both papers, Zimmerman found a significant deterrent 
effect of capital punishment. He estimated that each execution deterred an 
average of fourteen murders and that executions by electrocution had the 
strongest impact. . 
vii. H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings used state-level panel data from 
1 977 to 1 997 to examine the relationship between executions, commuta­
tions, and murder.4 1  Again, the authors found a significant deterrent effect; 
they estimated that each execution deterred an average of five murders. 
38. We also confirm that our results hold up to changes in our choice of regressors, estima­
tion method, and functional form. The deterrent variables' coefficients are remarkably consistent in 
sign and significance across eighty-four different regression models. In addition, we verify that the 
negative relationship between the death penalty and murder is not a spurious finding. Before-and­
after moratorium comparisons and regressions reveal that the death penalty does not cause a de­
crease in property crimes, suggesting that the deterrent effect is not reflecting general trends in 
crime. 
39. John R. Lott, Jr. & William M. Landes, Multiple Victim Public Shootings, Bombings, 
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handgun Laws: Contrasting Private and Public Law Enforcement 
(Univ. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 73, 2000). 
40. Paul R. Zimmerman, Estimates of the Deterrent Effect of Alternative Execution Methods 
in the United States: 1978-2000, AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Zimmerman, 
Alternative Execution Methods]; Paul R. Zimmerman, State Executions, Deterrence, and the Inci­
dence of Murder, Mar. 3, 2003, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=354680. 
4 1 .  H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the 
Deterrellt Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & EcoN. 453 (2003). 
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Their results also indicated that both commuting death row prisoners' sen­
tences and removing them from death row increased in murder. Specifically, 
each commutation resulted in approximately five extra murders and each 
removal from death row generated one additional murder. 
viii. A recent paper by Lawrence Katz, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shus­
torovich used state-level panel data covering the period 1 950-1990 to 
measure the relationship between prison conditions, capital punishment, and 
crime rates.42 They found that the nonexecution death rate among prisoners 
(a proxy for prison conditions) had a significant, negative relationship with 
overall violent crime rates and property crime rates; worse prison conditions 
deterred crime. As expected, the execution rate had no statistically signifi­
cant relationship with overall violent crime rates (which consist mainly of 
robbery and aggravated assault rates) and property crime rates; that is, exe­
cutions had no effect on noncapital crimes. 
The authors estimated several different models to test for a relationship 
between the execution rate and murder rates. Although some specifications 
showed no relationship, many models, especially those that controlled for 
the economic and demographic differences among states, did produce a de­
terrent effect. 
2. Modern Economics Papers Using Other Techniques 
All modem economics papers that used techniques other than panel data 
also found deterrence. 
i. Instead of a panel data study, Dale 0. Cloninger and Roberto 
Marchesini conducted a portfolio analysis that was, in effect, a controlled 
group experiment: the Texas unofficial moratorium on executions during 
most of 1 996.43 They found both that the moratorium appeared to have 
caused additional homicides and that murder rates significantly decreased 
after the moratorium was lifted. 
ii. Harold J. Brumm and Dale 0. Cloninger used cross-sectional data 
covering fifty-eight cities in 1 985 to distinguish between criminals' per­
ceived risk of punishment and the ex-post risk of punishment measured by 
arrest rates, conviction rates, or execution rates.44 They found that the per­
ceived risk of punishment, including the probability of execution, was 
negatively and significantly correlated with the homicide commission rate. 
iii. and iv. Two other papers, one by Isaac Ehrlich and Zhiqiang Liu and 
the other by Zhiqiang Liu, used Ehrlich's original state-level, cross-section 
data.45 Both found a strong deterrent effect. 
42. Lawrence Katz et al., Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. 
& EcoN. REV. 3 1 8  (2003). 
43. Dale 0. Cloninger & Roberto Marchesini, Execution and Deterrence: A Quasi­
Controlled Group Experiment, 33 APPLIED EcoN. 569 (200 1 ). 
44. Harold J. Brumm & Dale 0. Cloninger, Perceived Risk of Punishment and the Commis­
sion of Homicides: A Covariance Structure Analysis, 3 1  J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 ( 1 996). 
45. Isaac Ehrlich & Zhiqiang Liu, Sensitivity Analyses of the Deterrence Hypothesis: lets 
Keep the Econ in Econometrics, 42 J.L. & EcoN. 455 (1999); Zhiqiang Liu, Capital Punishment and 
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3. Modern Papers by Sociologists and Criminologists 
Sociologists have also studied the deterrent effect of capital punishment 
in several papers in sociology journals in the past decade. Although they 
employed empirical analysis, the methods they used are often very different 
from the methods used by economists. In contrast to the economics studies, 
most of the sociology studies find no deterrence. 
i. John K. Cochran, Mitchell B .  Chamlin, and Mark Seth examined the 
deterrence question using weekly, time-series data from Oklahoma from 
1989 to 1 99 1 .46 Although their weekly data was very disaggregated by time, 
the researchers severely restricted the number of observations in their study 
by limiting their analyses to the state of Oklahoma. Thus, they have only 
156 observations. In fact, only one execution took place in Oklahoma during 
this period. Furthermore, the authors included no variables to control for 
demographic, economic, law enforcement, or other factors on murder rates. 
The researchers concluded that there was no deterrent effect because they 
found no evidence of deterrence after the one execution during their sample 
period. 
ii. William Bailey used the same data as Cochran, Chamlin, and Seth to 
explore the deterrence issue and found no evidence of a deterrence effect.47 
Although his data suffered from having few observations and only one exe­
cution, Bailey extended the analyses to include control variables. Moreover, 
Bailey examined the effect of executions in other states on Oklahoma's 
murder rate. Although most capital punishment studies had assumed that 
deterrence was limited to the state where the execution occurs, Bailey meas­
ured whether there was a cross-state effect. He found no evidence of a 
deterrent effect within states or across states. 
iii. A paper by Jon Sorensen, Robert Wrinkle, Victoria Brewer, and 
James Marquart tested the deterrence hypothesis in Texas.48 The authors 
used monthly time-series data from the state of Texas from 1984 to 1997 
and found no deterrent effect when including the appropriate control vari­
ables.49 
the Deterrence Hypothesis: Some New Insights and Empirical Evidence, 30 E. EcoN. J. 237 (2004). 
The study by Ehrlich and Liu offers a theory-based sensitivity analysis of estimated deterrent effects. 
Liu 's study uses switching regression techniques in estimations that take into account the endoge­
nous nature of the status of the death penalty. 
46. John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization ? An Impact Assessme/11 of Okla­
homa's Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107 ( 1 994). 
47. William C. Bailey, Deterrence, Brutalization, and the Death Penalty: Another Examina­
tion of Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 7 1 1  ( 1 998). 
48. Jon Sorenson et al., Capital Punishment and Deterrence: Examining the Effect of Execu­
tions on Murder in Texas, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 481 ( 1 999). 
49. The authors restricted their analysis to an ordinary least squares regression that assumed 
that the causality between murder and law enforcement variables ran in only one direction: convic­
tion rates, incarceration rates, and executions affected crime rates, but crime rates did not affect 
conviction rates, incarceration rates, or executions. In contrast, almost all other capital punishment 
papers assumed that causality runs in both directions; for example, increasing murders may lead 
officials to direct more resources to fighting crime, increasing convictions, incarcerations, and exe-
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iv. James A .  Yunker tested the deterrence hypothesis using two sets of 
postmoratorium data: state cross-section data from 1976 to 1997, and national 
time-series data from 1930 to 1997.50 These data were vulnerable to many of 
the same criticisms as early economic studies. National time-series data may 
cause aggregation bias; cross-section data could not consider trends in crime 
or law enforcement variables and failed to control for omitted jurisdiction­
specific variables that may affect crime. He found a strong deterrent effect 
in the time-series data that disappeared when the data were limited to the 
1 930-197 6 period. Therefore, he concluded that postmoratorium data was 
critical in testing of the deterrence hypothesis. 
v. A paper by Richard Berk, a sociologist, found that eliminating a few 
specific states from the data caused estimates of capital punishment's aver­
age impact on murders across all states to show no deterrence.5 1  
4. Modern Papers in Law Reviews 
Two empirical papers testing whether capital punishment deters have 
been published in law reviews in the past decade. Both found no deterrence. 
i. Craig J. Albert tested the deterrence hypothesis using state-level panel 
data from 1 982 to 1994.52 He includes many of the same control variables as 
Ehrlich did in his early studies, but does not include any time variables. Like 
Ehrlich, he also performed both ordinary least squares regressions and two­
stage least squares regressions. Albert found no evidence of a deterrent ef­
fect. 
ii. Lisa Stolzenberg and Stewart J. D'  Alessio used monthly data and a 
different statistical procedure from other papers to examine the relationship 
between the frequency of executions, newspaper publicity, and the incidence 
of murder in Houston, Texas.53 They examined the period from January 1990 
to December 1994. The authors included no control variables to capture 
changes in economic, demographic, or other factors during the time period. 
The authors reported no deterrent effect. 
5. A Theory for Reconciling the Results 
Although the results of all of the articles in economics journals sup­
ported the deterrence hypothesis, this consensus did not cross disciplines. 
cutions. Ignoring the reverse causality could lead to biased results that underestimate, overestimate, 
or reverse the impact of law enforcement variables on crime. 
50. James A. Yunker, A New Statistical Analysis of Capital Punishment Incorporating U.S. 
Postmoratorium Data, 82 Soc. Sci. Q. 297 (200 1 ). 
5 1 .  Richard Berk, New Claims about Executions and General Deterrence: Deja Vu All Over 
Again ?, Mar. 1 1 ,  2005, available at http://preprints.stat.ucla.edu/396/JELS.pap.pdf. 
52. Craig J. Albert, Challenging Deterrence: New Insights on Capital Punishment Derived 
from Panel Data, 60 U. PITT. L. REV .  32 1 ( 1999). 
53.  They use "fully recursive vector ARMA [regressions] . . . .  " Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart 
J. D' Alessio, Capital Punishment, Execution Publicity and Murder in Houston, Texas, 94 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 35 1 ,  352 (2004). 
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Most of the articles in sociology journals and law reviews found no evi­
dence of a deterrent effect. 
The contrasting conclusions may all be correct if capital punishment's 
impact on the murder rate differs among jurisdictions. Because the studies 
examined different jurisdictions in different periods, some may examine 
jurisdictions that have an overall deterrent effect while others examine juris­
dictions that experience no deterrence. The rest of this Article will explore 
both whether the deterrent effect differs across states and possible causes of 
the earlier studies' differing results. 
Ill. TESTING THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS AMONG STATES 
After reviewing differences in the frequency and manner with which 
states apply capital punishment, I describe my empirical model for testing 
executions' impact on murders in each state. I then discuss the model's re­
sults: executions' impact varies widely among states, deterring murders in 
some states, but increasing them in others. Finally, I show how this Article's 
results reconcile results from earlier papers. 
A. Differences in the Application of Capital Punishment across States 
There are great differences in the application of the death penalty across 
states. For example, states vary widely in their definitions of capital crimes, 
their frequency of imposing capital sentences, their frequency of executions, 
their methods of execution, and the publicity their executions receive. These 
important differences might affect the deterrent impact of each states' execu­
tions. 
Table 1 and Appendices 1 through 3 present some of the important dif­
ferences between states' application of the death penalty. Appendix 1 
discusses the crimes punishable by death as of 2001 .  It is difficult precisely 
to compare states' laws for capital punishment because states define first­
degree murder and aggravating factors differently. But there are important 
differences in the crimes punishable by death. For example, in Georgia, any 
murder is technically a death-eligible crime, although, of course, the U.S. 
Constitution substantially limits the reach of Georgia's death penalty. In 
contrast, Alabama and Pennsylvania treat only first-degree murders with 
eighteen aggravating circumstances to be punishable by death. 
Although the legislation listed in Appendix 1 tells us what crimes could 
be punished by death in each state, states vary tremendously in how often 
they actually sentence people to death. Table 1 reports the number of death 
row sentences imposed between 1 977 and 1 996; the table includes informa­
tion only on states that have actually sentenced people to death during this 
period.54 The numbers vary from an extreme high of 7 1 3  death row sen­
tences in Florida to only one death row sentence in New York. 
54. For this table, I limit my sample to 1977-1996 because my empirical estimations cover 
this period. 
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TABLE I 
EXECUTIONS AND DEATH Row SENTENCES: 1 977-1 996 
Number of Death Number of 
State Row Sentences Executions 
Alabama 294 1 3  
Arizona 207 6 
Arkansas 90 12 
California 560 4 
Colorado 1 2  0 
Connecticut 6 0 
Delaware 22 8 
Florida 713  38 
Georgia 226 22 
Idaho 34 1 
Illinois 262 8 
Indiana 82 4 
Kentucky 60 0 
Louisiana 1 28 23 
Maryland 47 1 
Mississippi 1 33 4 
Missouri 1 42 23 
Montana 1 0  1 
Nebraska 1 9  2 
Nevada 1 1 9  6 
New Jersey 48 0 
New Mexico 1 3  0 
New York 1 0 
North Carolina 308 8 
Ohio 249 0 
Oklahoma 238 8 
Oregon 52 1 
Pennsylvania 283 2 
South Carolina 1 29 1 1  
South Dakota 2 0 
Tennessee 1 42 0 
Texas 668 1 07 
Utah 1 7  5 
Virginia 1 04 37 
Washington 28 2 
Wyoming 5 1 
As with death sentences, the number of executions that states perform 
varies substantially. The last column of Table 1 reports each state's number 
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of executions performed between 1 977 and 1996. Some states produce 
many death sentences, but few executions. For example, during the sample 
period, California condemned 560 people, but executed only four. Twelve 
states do not have laws that authorize capital punishment: Alaska, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Of the thirty-eight states that 
currently have capital punishment laws, eleven had performed no executions 
prior to 1 997: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee.55 
At the other extreme, Texas performed 107 executions between 1 977 and 
1 997. 
Appendix 2 lists the authorized methods of execution by state. All states 
except Nebraska allow executions by lethal injection; Nebraska still requires 
electrocution.56 Some states allow prisoners to choose between lethal injec­
tion and electrocution. Utah allows prisoners to be executed by firing squad 
if the inmates chose this method before the passage of legislation in 2004 
banning the practice.57 
States also differ in how much publicity each execution receives. Ap­
pendix 3 reports each state's average number of newspaper articles and news 
transcripts found on LexisNexis that covered each execution between 1997 
and 1 999.58 The numbers differ widely: Colorado and Ohio had averages of 
over 700 news reports (including both newspapers and transcripts) for each 
of their executions, probably because of their novelty, as these were the first 
executions in the states. At the other extreme, there was only one news tran­
script on LexisNexis reporting on Montana's 1998 execution. 
The substantial differences in both the application of capital punishment 
and publicity about it might cause differences in whether each state's execu­
tions are a deterrent. The next Section explores whether there are differences 
in executions' impact among states. 
To be sure, there are many other differences among states in the applica­
tion of capital punishment. However, most of the differences, such as 
whether capital punishment is applied unfairly or in a racist manner, are 
impossible to measure. Standard statistics demonstrates that the absence 
from the analysis of these other factors will not harm the results except in 
55.  Colorado and Kentucky performed their first executions in 1997, New Mexico executed 
its first prisoner in 200 1 ,  Ohio performed its first execution in 1999, and Tennessee executed its first 
prisoner in 2000. New York's death penalty law was declared unconstitutional in 2004. People v. 
La Valle, 8 1 7  N.E.2d 34 1 ,  344 (N.Y. 2004). 
56. Nebraska's last execution was in 1997, by electrocution. 
57. Two of Utah's six executions since 1977 have been by firing squad. Four more execu­
tions by firing squad are scheduled for upcoming years. 
58. I used LexisNexis to search for the name of each executed person in the month before 
the execution, the month of the execution, and the month after the execution. I searched both news­
papers in the state where the execution took place and all news transcripts. Although the numbers 
are good approximations of the amount of publicity each execution receives, they are not perfect 
because LexisNexis does not cover all newspapers and started covering some newspapers in the mid 
to late 1 990s. I searched for executions only after 1997 to minimize the problem of lack of or un­
even coverage. 
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the rare situation where the omitted factors are closely correlated with the 
included variables.59 
B .  Data and Empirical Model 
Because the data and techniques of my 2003 paper60 were accepted in a 
leading peer-reviewed journal and have become well-known in the capital 
punishment debate,61 I use the same data and similar analyses as before as 
my model, except that I now test the effect of executions in different states. 
The data are a panel-data set that covers 3,054 counties for the 1977-1996 
period. It is a well-known data set that has been used not only in my 2003 
capital-punishment paper, but in several other empirical studies of crime.62 
The county-level data allow me to include county-specific characteristics in 
my analysis; I discuss the county-level economic and demographic variables 
below. This reduces the aggregation problem from which much of the litera­
ture suffers. By controlling for these characteristics, I can better isolate the 
effect of punishment policy.63 
To test capital punishment's effect in different states, I estimate a system 
of equations that represents the interaction between criminals and the 
59. See PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO EcoNOMETRICS 91 (3d ed. 1 992). 
60. Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 .  
6 1 .  Publicity surrounding the original study included television interviews on CNN Sunday; 
National Fox News; The O'Reilly Factor on the National Fox News Network; and CBS, ABC, and 
FOX local affiliates. Print interviews included the Chronicle of Higher Education and The Atlanta 
Business Chronicle. Radio interviews included BBC; Five Alive; WJR in Detroit, MI; KRLD in 
Arlington, TX; WLW in Cincinnati, OH; KTSA in San Antonio, TX; CHED in Edmonton, Canada; 
WRVA in Richmond, VA; CJME in Saskatoon, Canada; NTR in Saskatoon, Canada; WMVZ in 
Detroit, Ml; KXNT in Las Vegas, NV; and KRLA in Los Angeles, CA. The paper was also cited in 
the National Center for Policy Analysis; Executive Alert; The Weekly Standard; and The National 
Journal. The paper was also requested for use by the Senate Judiciary Committee; U.S. Naval Acad­
emy; House of Representatives (Rep. Bob Goodlatt); Attorney General of Alabama; New York State 
Assembly (Stephen Kaufman); and the Chief of Criminal Appeals Division of Chicago (Renee 
Goldfarb). 
62. Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 ;  see also EARL L. GRINOLS ET AL., CASINOS, CRIME 
AND COMMUNITY COSTS (Univ. of Ill. & Univ. of Ga., Working Paper, 2000); LOTT, JR. & LANDES, 
supra note 39; Eric D. Gould et al., Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the 
United States: 1979-1997, 84 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 45 (2002); John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, 
Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 ,  39-48 ( 1 997); 
David B. Mustard, Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance of Omitted Variable Bias, 85 
REV. EcoN. & STAT. 205 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent 
Ef ect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 3 1  J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (2002); Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Police, Prosecutors, Criminals, and Determinate Sentencing: The Truth about Truth-in­
Sentencing Laws, 45 J.L. & EcoN. 509 (2002). 
63. Moreover, panel data allow me to overcome the unobservable heterogeneity problem that 
affects cross-sectional studies. Neglecting heterogeneity can lead to biased estimates. I use the time 
dimension of the data to estimate county-fixed effects and condition my two-stage estimation on 
these effects. This is equivalent to using county dummies to control for unobservable variables that 
differ among counties. This way I control for the unobservable heterogeneity that arises from county 
specific attributes such as attitudes towards crime, or crime reporting practices. These attributes may 
be correlated with the justice-system variables (or other exogenous variables of the model) giving 
rise to endogeneity and biased estimation. An advantage of the data set is its resilience to common 
panel problems such as self-selectivity, nonresponse, attrition, or sampling design shortfalls. 
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criminal justice system. Such systems are commonly used in empirical 
studies of crime, and especially in empirical studies of capital punishment.64 
A system of equations, instead of a single equation, is required because of 
the relationship between murder rates and the behavior of the police and 
court system. Specifically, if there is a deterrent effect, then increases in 
what I call the "deterrent factors"-the probability of arrest, the probability 
of receiving a death row sentence, or the probability of execution-should 
cause murder rates to decrease. However, the causal relationship could also 
run in the other direction: increases in murder rates could pressure police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries to increase arrest rates, death row sentencing 
rates, and execution rates. Because a single-equation model would be unable 
to capture, and correct for, the reverse causality, the model could produce 
biased, incorrect results. My system of equations addresses that problem. 
1. A Summary of the Model 
The model has four equations. The first equation examines the influ­
ences on the murder rate of various factors, including the deterrent 
variables; the second through fourth equations model the influence on each 
of the deterrent variables. In a nutshell: 
The first equation measures how murder rates respond to the deterrent 
variables and other demographic and economic factors; 
the second equation measures the effect on the first deterrent variable, 
the probability of arrest, of murder rates and police expenditures; 
the third equation measures the effect on the second deterrent variable, 
the probability of a capital sentence, of murder rates, expenditures on 
the judicial system, prison admissions, and a partisan influence variable 
that measures the political conservatism of a state's voters; and 
the fourth equation measures the effect on the final deterrent variable, 
the probability of execution, of murder rates, expenditures on the judi­
cial system, and a partisan influence variable. 
The system of equations is the same system used in my previous capital­
punishment paper65 with one exception: instead of using one execution vari­
able that estimates the average deterrent effect across all executions in all 
states, I use fifty execution variables that estimate the deterrent effect sepa­
rately for each state. 
64. See all of the modem economics papers listed supra Section Ill.B. l .  
65. Dezhbakhsh et al., supra note 3 1 ,  at 352. 
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2. The Model 's Technical Structure 
For technically-inclined readers, I express the system symbolically: 
Pa;,r = </Ji,; + ¢i. M;,r + ¢.J PE;,r + rA TD1 + �.r , (2) 
where M is county murder rates, Pa is the arrest rate for murder in each 
county, Psla is the conditional probability of receiving a death sentence if 
arrested, Pels is the conditional probability of execution if sentenced to 
death row, Z is a series of economic and demographic variables, PE is police 
payroll expenditure, JE is public expenditure on all participants in the judi­
cial system, PI is partisan influence as measured by the Republican 
presidential candidate's percentage of the statewide vote in the most recent 
election, PA is prison admissions, TD is a set of time dummies that capture 
national trends in these perceived probabilities, and r; ,  � and s are error 
terms. 
3. The Model 's Details 
The first equation measures the response of the behavior of criminals to 
the deterrent factors while controlling for a series of other factors found in 
the series Z. To determine whether a change in the murder rate is really due 
to the deterrent variables, the equation permits us to make sure that the other 
factors are not really the cause of the change. First, Z includes the aggra­
vated assault and robbery rates because some murders are the by-products of 
violent activities such as aggravated assault and robbery. Including these 
variables permits us to see whether a change in the murder rate is due to a 
change in the deterrent variables, or is instead due to a change in the number 
of aggravated assaults or robberies. 
In addition, Z measures possible economic and demographic influences 
on crime. Economic variables are used as proxy for legitimate and illegiti­
mate earning opportunities. An increase in legitimate earning opportunities 
increases the opportunity cost of committing crime, and should result in a 
decrease in the crime rate. For example, if more higher-paying jobs become 
available, then criminals may stop committing crimes and obtain these jobs 
instead. Likewise, an increase in illegitimate earning opportunities increases 
the expected benefits of committing crime, and should result in an increase 
in the crime rate. 
The economic variables that I use are real per capita personal income, 
real per capita unemployment insurance payments, and real per capita in­
come maintenance payments. The income variable measures both the labor 
market prospects of potential criminals and the amount of wealth available 
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to steal. The unemployment payments variable is a proxy for overall labor 
market conditions and the availability of legitimate jobs for potential crimi­
nals. The transfer payments variable represents other nonmarket income 
earned by poor or unemployed people. 
Demographic variables include population density, and six gender and 
race segments of the population ages ten to twenty-nine (male, female; 
black, white, other). Population density is included to capture any relation­
ship between drug activities in inner cities, which are correlated with 
population density, and the murder rate. For example, an increase in crime 
in a county may not be due to changes in the deterrent variables, but instead 
to increasing population density. 
The age, gender, and race variables represent the possible differential 
treatment of certain segments of the population by the justice system, 
changes in the opportunity cost of time through the life cycle, and gen­
der/racially based differences in earning opportunities. For example, an 
increase in crime could be due to an increase in the number of young mi­
norities, who, because of racial discrimination by employers, have no 
legitimate job opportunities, and must instead tum to crime. 
The control variables also include the state level National Rifle Associa­
tion (NRA) membership rate. It is possible that the level of gun ownership 
could affect the crime level, either up or down.66 
The last three equations measure the influences on the level of effort of 
law enforcement agencies and the criminal justice system in apprehending, 
convicting, and punishing perpetrators. Police and judicial/legal expendi­
ture, PE and JE, represent spending on enforcement. As more expenditures 
increase law enforcement's capabilities, the probabilities of both arrest and 
conviction given arrest should increase. 
Partisan influence, indicating whether a jurisdiction is conservative, is 
used to capture any political pressure to get tough with criminals, a message 
popular with Republican candidates. The influence is exerted through 
changing the makeup of the court system, such as the appointment of new 
judges or prosecutors who are tough on crime. This affects the justice sys­
tem and is, therefore, included in equations (3) and (4). 
Prison admission, defined as the number of new court commitments ad­
mitted during each year,67 is a proxy for the existing burden on the justice 
system. The burden may affect judicial outcomes. For example, judges may 
hesitate to impose long sentences if the jails have recently been filled with 
many new sentenced prisoners. 
As is standard and appropriate in such analysis, all four equations also 
include a set of time dummy variables that capture national trends and influ­
ences affecting all counties but varying over time. The variables correct for 
the possibility that a change in murder rate may be due, not to the deterrent 
variables, but to national trends in murder rates. In addition, county dum­
mies are included to control for unobservable variables that differ among 
counties, such as differences in crime, attitudes towards crime, or differ­
ences in the justice system. Two states may continually have different 
66. Lott, Jr. & Mustard, supra note 62. 
67. This does not include returns of parole violators, escapees, failed appeals, or transfers. 
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murder rates, not because of differences in the deterrent variables, but be­
cause of other unobservable differences between the two states. The county 
dummy variables will capture any factors that I have not otherwise included 
that are constant for a county over time. 
As is normal and appropriate, I estimate the simultaneous system of 
equations ( 1 )-(4) with a corrected68 two-stage least squares regression.69 
4. The Model's Six Variations 
Following my earlier paper's analysis, I estimated six different versions 
of my model.70 The models differ only in the way that the perceived prob­
abilities of a death sentence and execution are measured. Estimating these 
probabilities in different ways is standard in empirical crime papers and 
even dates back to Ehrlich's first capital punishment paper.7 1  I based the 
variant models on those most often seen in the literature. 
For Model 1 ,  the conditional execution probability-the probability that 
a person with a death sentence is actually executed-is measured by execu­
tions at year t divided by number of death sentences six years earlier, at year 
t-6. For Model 2 this probability is measured by number of executions six 
years in the future at t+6, divided by the number of death sentences at t. The 
two ratios reflect forward looking and backward looking expectations, re­
spectively. The displacement lag of six years reflects the lengthy waiting 
time between sentencing and execution, which averages six years for the 
period I study.72 
For the probability of a death sentence given that a person has been ar­
rested, I use a two-year lag displacement, reflecting an estimated two-year 
lag between arrest and sentencing. Therefore, the conditional sentencing 
probability for Model 1 is measured by the number of death sentences in 
year t divided by the number of arrests for murder at year t..:i.. For Model 2 
this probability is measured by number of death sentences at t+2 divided by 
number of arrests for murder at t. Because of the absence of an arrest lag­
arrests usually occur soon after a murder-no lag displacement is used to 
68. The estimation is weighted to correct for the heteroskedasticity of the error term. These 
equations represent the aggregation of an individual 's equations. In the individual equations, the 
error terms are stochastic with mean zero and variance c 2 • Because of this, when the error terms 
are summed over n (the number of people in the county), the new error terms are heteroskedastic 
because their variances ( c 2 / n ) are proportional to county population. Tests for 
heteroskedasticity indicate that the error term in the unweighted regression is indeed 
heteroskedastic. Tests indicate that the heteroskedasticity has been corrected after weighting by the 
square root of the county population. In addition, tests for overidentification indicate that the model 
is correctly specified and employs valid instruments. 
69. I chose a single-equation method, two-stage least squares, over a systems method be­
cause in a systems method any specification error in one equation is propagated throughout the 
system, which can lead to inconsistency. WILLIAM H. GREENE, EcoNOMETRIC ANALYSIS 616  (2d ed. 
1 993). Single-equation methods, such as two-stage least squares, confine the error to the particular 
equation in which it appears. 
70. Dezhbakhsh, et al., supra note 3 1 ,  at 36 1 .  
7 1 .  See Ehrlich, supra note 1 9. 
72. THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 8. 
228 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:203 
measure the arrest probability. It is simply the number of murder-related 
arrests at t divided by the number of murders at t. 
These measures are not the true probabilities of arrest, sentencing, or 
execution. Instead, they are averages. However, they are closer to the prob­
abilities as viewed by potential murderers than would be the true measures. 
This formulation from our previous paper is consistent with a previous study 




For Model 3, I measure the conditional probability of execution given a 
death sentence by using a six-year moving average. The probability of exe­
cution at year t is defined as the sum of executions during (t+2, t+l ,  t, t- 1 ,  t-
2, and t-3) divided by the sum of death sentences issued during (t-4, t-5, t-6, 
t-7, t-8, and t-9). The six-year window length and the six-year displacement 
lag capture the average time from sentence to execution for my sample. In a 
similar fashion, a two-year lag and a two-year window length is used to 
measure the conditional death sentencing probabilities. Given the absence of 
an arrest lag, no averaging or lag displacement is used when computing ar­
rest probabilities. 
Models 4, 5, and 6 are similar to Models 1 ,  2, and 3 except for the way 
they treat undefined probabilities. In several years some counties had no 
murders, and some states had no death sentences. This rendered some prob­
abilities in Models 1 through 3 undefined because of a zero denominator. 
Estimates in Models 1 through 3 are obtained excluding these observations. 
To avoid losing data points in Models 4 through 6, for any observation 
(county/year) where the probabilities of arrest or execution are undefined, I 
substituted the relevant probability from the most recent year when the prob­
ability was not undefined. I look back up to four years, because in most cases 
this eradicates the problem of undefined probabilities. The assumption under­
lying such substitution is that criminals will use the most recent information 
available in forming their expectations. So a person contemplating committing 
a crime at year t will not assume that he will not be arrested if no crime was 
committed, and hence no arrest was made, during this period. Rather, he will 
form an impression of the arrest odds based on arrests in recent years. This 
approach mirrors that in earlier published research.74 
None of the models is necessarily more theoretically correct than the 
others. They each represent a different way that criminals may think about 
their probability of execution, for example, do criminals think about how 
many people were sentenced to death row six years ago and how many peo­
ple were executed this year (Models 1 and 4), or do they consider how many 
people were sentenced to death row this year and how many people they 
expect to be executed six years from now (Models 2 and 5), or do they apply 
an averaging approach and consider the sum of how many people have been 
73. Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. PoL. EcoN. 1 272 ( 199 1 ). 
74. See id. For the states that have never had an execution, the conditional probability of 
execution takes a value of zero. For the states that have never sentenced anyone to death row, the 
conditional probability of a death row sentence takes a value of zero. 
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executed recently and will be in the next few years versus the sum of how 
many people were sent to death row over a six-year period in the past (Mod­
els 3 and 6)? Because no one is sure which model best describes how 
criminals perceive risks, I present results from all of them. 
C. Empirical Results 
The results are striking. Executions deter murder in a few states, have no 
impact in a few more, but increase murders in many more states than the 
number where there is deterrence. 
The results of the two-stage least squares, weighted estimation with 
fixed effects, is reported in the table in Appendix 4. Although I estimate the 
entire simultaneous equation system ( 1)-(4) for each of the six variations of 
the model separately, I report in the table the results of only the murder 
equation ( 1 ) ;  this is the equation that reveals the relationship between execu­
tions and the murder rate. 75 The table presents the results of all six variations 
of the model because none of the models is necessarily most correct. 
The table reports the total effect of the execution probability on the 
murder rate in each state. For each state and model, the regression coeffi­
cient (top number) indicates the magnitude and direction of the effect. A 
negative coefficient indicates deterrence. A positive coefficient indicates that 
executions instead increase murders. In the capital punishment literature, an 
increase in murders because of executions is often referred to as a "brutali­
zation effect." Executions create an atmosphere of brutality that spurs 
criminals to more violence. 
7 5. The effects of many other variables on murder are also consistent across models. As 
expected, the murder rate has a statistically significant, positive relationship with both the aggra­
vated assault rate and the robbery rate in all six models. Many murders are committed during 
another crime. The arrest rate and probability of receiving a death row sentence are negatively re­
lated to the murder rate in most models, indicating a deterrent effect of these variables. However, the 
probability of a death row sentence is not statistically significant in some of the models. 
Many of the demographic variables also have the expected relationships with murder rates. 
The percent of the county population that is African American has a statistically significant, positive 
relationship with murder in most of the models. Some minority groups have fewer legitimate earn­
ing opportunities, and thus a lower opportunity cost of criminal activities relative to their white 
counterparts. The percentage of the population that is male has a statistically significant, positive 
relationship with murder in all models; most murders are committed by men. The percentage of the 
population that is ten to nineteen years of age has a negative and significant relationship with mur­
der in most of the models. 
The murder rate is positively related to both per capita real income and per capita real welfare 
payments in all models. This suggests that overall income measurements for a county represent the 
amount of wealth available to steal in the county; as the amount of wealth available to steal in­
creases, crime increases. The real per capita unemployment insurance payments have a statistically 
significant, negative relationship with murder rates: more aid to unemployed people lowers their 
need for criminal activity. 
Population density has a statistically significant, negative relationship in all models. Although 
murder rates are higher in more densely populated cities, they are not higher in more densely popu­
lated counties-my unit of measurement. The majority of the most densely populated counties are 
suburban counties that tend to have lower crime rates than either urban or rural counties. 
The coefficients for three variables are statistically insignificant in most models: the percent­
age of the population that is twenty to twenty-nine, the percentage of the population that belongs to 
a minority group other than African American, and the NRA membership rate. 
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Not all of the results are statistically significant. The table reports the t­
statistics (bottom number) for each state and model. T-statistics equal to or 
greater than 1 .645 are considered statistically significant at the 10% level 
and t-statistics equal to or greater than 1 .96 are considered statistically sig­
nificant at the 5% level. A t-statistic of 1 .645 means that there is ninety 
percent certainty that the coefficient is different from zero. Empiricists typi­
cally require t-statistics of at least 1 .645 to conclude that one variable affects 
another in the direction indicated by the coefficient. 
The results reveal large variation across states in capital punishment's 
effect on murder. Among the twenty-seven states that had at least one execu­
tion during the sample period, there are states where executions deter 
murders. There are states where executions have no effect on murder. And 
there are many states where executions increase murders. 
Despite the differences in the way the conditional probabilities are esti­
mated across the six models, the results for each state are quite robust. 
Although the level of statistical significance differs for some models, the 
direction (that is, positive or negative effect) of the statistically significant 
coefficients within each ·state is the same, regardless of the model. 
To permit interpretation of the results in Appendix 4, I transformed the 
statistically significant coefficients from each of the six models into each 
state's increase or decrease in number of murders after one execution.76 
From among these, I then selected each state's median change. 
Each state 's median increase or decrease in murders per execution is 
graphed in Figure 2. The figure shows that the executions in six states have a 
deterrent effect. For these states, the median decrease in the number of mur­
ders from each execution ranges from sixty-one in South Carolina to six in 
Nevada. Eight states experience no change in murders after executions. 
76. The coefficients in Table I are the partial derivatives of murder per 100,000 population 
with respect to each model's measure of the probability of execution given sentencing. Given the 
measurement of these variables, the following transformations give the change in the number of 
murders as a result of one execution in 1996 (the most recent year of data): 
B3 (Population199/l 00,000) ( l !S1990) for models 1 and 4, 
BJ (Population1990/100,000) ( l lS1990) for models 2 and 5, 
BJ (Population199/l 00,000) ( ll[S1992+ S1991+ S1990+ S1989+S1988+S1987] for models 
3 and 6, 
where S is the number of individuals sentenced to death. I perform these transformations for 
every coefficient in Table I that is significant at the 10% level. Then, I find the median result of the 
transformations for each state to obtain the median increase or decrease in number of murders after 
one execution. I use medians instead of means so that the numbers will not be influenced by ex­
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FIGURE 2 
INDIVIDUAL STATE DETERRENT EFFECTS: 
NUMBER OF MURDERS DETERRED OR INCITED 






In contrast, thirteen states have a median increase in murders after each 
execution, suggesting a brutalization effect. The magnitude of the increase 
ranges from three in Oklahoma to 1 75 in Utah and Oregon.77 However, three 
of the states experiencing an increase-Idaho, Maryland, and Oregon­
performed only one execution during my sample period. Much caution is in 
order before drawing conclusions based on the experience of one execution. 
Figure 2 reports a very different picture from the previous empirical 
studies that found that executions deterred murders. In many states, execu­
tions have a brutalization effect, increasing the number of murders. In 
contrast, a deterrent effect exists in far fewer states. Likewise, more than 
three times as many states have a brutalization effect or no effect (twenty­
one) than have a deterrent effect (six). 
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations permit a very rough estimate of 
the sizes of the brutalization and deterrent effects for states that are above 
and below the threshold. We can also get some idea of the net effect. It 
should be recognized that, because of the calculation method, the estimates 
are very imprecise. Nonetheless, they provide some idea of orders of magni­
tude. 
77. The special characteristics of the executions in Utah and Oregon may cause the large 
increase in murders. Utah has executed people by firing squad, and Oregon executed only one per­
son during the sample period. 
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There were 192 executions between 1977 and 1 996 in deterrent states, 
fifty-four in no-effect states, and 1 12 in brutalization states. I multiplied the 
median number of murders deterred or incited in each state by the total 
number of executions in each state to compute the net lives saved or lost. In 
deterrent states over the twenty-year sample period, executions saved ap­
proximately 6,91 8  lives. 
Subtracting the 1 92 executions yields a net lives saved of 6,726, or ap­
proximately 336 per year. In no-effect states, fifty-four lives were lost, all 
executions. 
In brutalization states, the 1 1 2  executions caused approximately 5 ,246 
murders-again, this estimate is very rough. Adding the 1 1 2  executions 
yields the total lives lost of 5,358. This was 268 per year. 
Although these estimates are inexact, they do suggest that both the de­
terrent and brutalization effects can be substantial. Executions save many 
lives in deterrent states. But, in brutalization states, they lead to the deaths of 
almost as many innocent people. 
The following rough comparison of the lives saved in deterrent states 
and lost in brutalization states suggests that, for the country as a whole, 
capital punishment saves lives. That is, considering the country as a whole 
and adding the effects in every state that conducts capital punishment, my 
results suggest, if with imprecision, that executions save lives. Said another 
way, if the country's only choices were either to continue with the present 
levels of executions in each state or end executions in all states, then con­
tinuing the executions saves lives. 
Considering the lives only of innocent people-ignoring the deaths of 
the convicts whom executions kill directly-capital punishment saves lives. 
Subtracting the murders caused in the brutalization states (very roughly 
5 ,246) from those saved in the deterrence states (6,9 1 8) shows that net lives 
saved nationwide from executions is 1 ,672, or eighty-four per year. Capital 
punishment even saves lives if we add in the lives of those who are exe­
cuted. Subtracting both the 5 ,358 total lives lost in brutalization states, 
including the lives of those executed and the additional murders caused by 
the executions, and the fifty-four executions in no-effect states, from the 
6,726 net lives saved in deterrent states yields a net saving of 1 ,3 14, or 
sixty-six per year. 
The results also show that, if saving lives were the only goal, the present 
pattern of executions is bad policy. Although capital punishment's net effect 
is now to save lives, thousands more lives could be saved if states with ei­
ther no-effect or net brutalization ceased executing people. If only the 
deterrence states continued with their executions, then 6,9 1 8  innocent lives 
would be saved, or 346 per year-far more than the present system's eighty­
four per year. Because of the brutalization in many states, the present system 
causes approximately 262 innocent people each year to die unnecessarily. 
If we also consider the lives of those executed, the present system looks 
even worse. If only deterrence states continued executions, then a net of 
6, 726, or 336 per year, would be saved, compared to only 1 ,3 14, or sixty-six 
per year, if the present system continues. That is, approximately 270 people 
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per year now die unnecessarily because of capital punishment in states 
where it does not deter. 
D .  Reconciliation with Other Papers 
This Article's results are consistent with the findings of deterrence in 
previous economics papers. The weighted average of all of the increases or 
decreases shown in Figure 1 ,  where the weights are each state's  total num­
ber of executions between 1977 and 1996, is a negative 4.5;  each execution 
deters, on average, 4.5 murders. Because states with a deterrent effect have 
large numbers of executions, the average nationwide effect per execution is 
deterrence, even though the effect in most states is brutalization or no effect. 
That is, when estimating the average effect on murders across all states, in­
stead of estimating separate effects for each state, the results indicate a 
deterrent effect.78 When all states are lumped together, the deterrent effect in 
six states conceals both the brutalization effect in thirteen states and the 
complete absence of effect in the rest. 
Moreover, the results help us to understand the results of the non­
economics papers that find no deterrence. These papers tend to focus on 
individual jurisdictions, rather than on the United States as a whole. Like 
those papers, my present research shows that, in many states, executions do 
not deter. 
The results also are consistent with Richard Berk's recent paper, which 
suggested that findings of a deterrent effect in nationwide estimates disap­
pear if certain states such as Texas are eliminated from the analysis.79 My 
results show that Texas is one of the states with a large deterrent effect. If 
Texas' deterrent effect and large number of executions are excluded from 
national averages, then it is not surprising that the nationwide average deter­
rent effect would become smaller; there would be fewer executions with a 
deterrent effect to outweigh the executions with a brutalization effect. 
IV. A THRESHOLD EFFECT HELPS TO EXPLAIN CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT'S DIFFERING IMPACTS ACROSS STATES 
I now examine possible causes of the different effects of executions in 
different states. First, I examine summary statistics of the characteristics of 
states with a deterrent effect, states with no effect, and states with a brutali­
zation effect. Then, I perform additional regressions on the characteristics 
that differ significantly among the three groups of states. Finally, I discuss 
the results' implications. 
To summarize, the analysis suggests a threshold effect. In states with 
fewer than a threshold of approximately nine executions during the sample 
78. My results are consistent with a recent study that shows that, in analyses that estimate 
capital punishment's average effect on murders across all states, dropping certain states from the 
analyses makes the overall deterrent effect disappear. Berk, supra note 5 1 .  
79. See id. 
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period, each execution increases the number of murders. In states that ex­
ceed the threshold, executions deter murder. Deterrence and nondeterrence 
states are not different in a statistically significant way in the other factors 
that I examine, such as how much publicity executions receive, the charac­
teristics of the executed people, and the method of execution. 
A .  Summary Statistics 
I group the states that had at least one execution into three groups: states 
with a deterrent effect (Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Nevada, South Carolina, 
and Texas), states with no effect (Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming), and states with a 
brutalization effect (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Virginia, and Washington). 
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of seven characteristics for 
each group of states, including the average amount of capital punishment, 
the amount of publicity that executions receive in the states, the characteris­
tics of the executed people, and the execution method. For each 
characteristic, I also perform a mean comparison test between the states 
with a deterrent effect and all other states. The results of this test indicate 
whether the difference between the means is statistically significant. 
TABLE 2 
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATES WHERE EXECUTIONS DETER MURDERS, 
EXECUTIONS HAVE No EFFECT ON MURDERS, AND 





States with Deterrent 
States with States with Brutalization States and 
Deterrent Effect No Effect Effect Other States 
Total Number of 32 (mean) 6.7 8.6 2.71 *  
Executions 1 6.5 (median) 3 5 
Total Number of 31 2.8 1 49.3 1 42.2 1 .97+ 
Death Row 1 77.5 1 37.5 90 
Sentences 
Average Publicity 63.8 36.6 1 1 6.2 .76 
per Execution 54.8 37 80.5 
% of Executions 70.7 80.1 50.37 .58 
That Were Single- 8 1 . 1  89.1 62.5 
Victim Offenders 





States with Deterrent 
States with States with Brutalization States and 
Deterrent Effect No Effect Effect Other States 
% of Executions 24.6 41 .2 1 8.2 . 1 7  
That Were 22.5 27.3 1 6.7 
Offenders with No 
Prior Felony 
Record 
% of Executions 50.4 87.4 42.6 .62 
That Were 47.0 100 50 




% of Executions 34.67 25 1 2.02 1 .04 
bv Electrocution 10  0 0 
Notes: The mean (top number) and median (bottom number) of each variable are reported. "*" 
indicates that the test is significant at the 5% level; "+" indicates that the test is significant at the 
1 0% level. 
1 .  Amount of Capital Punishment 
First, I examine differences between the groups in their total number of 
executions and total number of death row sentences to determine if the fre­
quency of executions or death row sentences is related to a state's deterrent 
or brutalization effect. The execution numbers differ substantially. States 
with a deterrent effect performed an average of thirty-two executions be­
tween 1977 and 1996. States with either no effect or a brutalization effect 
conducted far fewer executions: approximately one-quarter as many, on av­
erage. States with no effect performed an average of 6.7 executions, while 
states with a brutalization effect performed an average of 8.6 executions 
during this period. 
The pattern is similar for death row sentences. Again, deterrent states 
have far more death row sentences than states with no effect or a brutaliza­
tion effect: more than twice as many, on average. However, brutalization 
states have the fewest death row sentences, with no-effect states averaging 
slightly more than brutalization states. 
Mean comparison tests indicate that the average total number of execu­
tions are statistically different between deterrent states and other states at the 
5% level. Likewise, the average values of the total number of death row sen­
tences are statistically different between deterrence states and other states at 
the 10% level. 
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2. Publicity 
If executions are to have any effect on murders, the publicity surround­
ing each execution should influence the magnitude of the effect.so Mean and 
median publicity per execution is somewhat higher for brutalization states, 
perhaps because the executions in the states were often the states '  first exe­
cution after the moratorium. In contrast, in states where executions are 
frequent, each execution receives relatively little attention, however, mean­
comparison tests indicate that there is no statistically significant difference 
between deterrent states and other states in the average publicity per execu­
tion.s 1  
3 .  Characteristics of Executed Persons 
I explore differences in the types of people executed to determine 
whether this influences the different effect of capital punishment in the 
states. Regression results from a separate project confirm that the deterrent 
effect is larger for executions of people who have killed multiple victims 
(instead of one victim), executions of people with no prior felony record, 
and executions of people who were not on probation or parole or had es­
caped from prison.s2 However, the mean and median values of these 
characteristics are similar across the deterrent states, brutalization states, 
and the no-effect states. Moreover, mean-comparison tests indicate that 
, there is no significant difference in the types of people executed among the 
three groups of states. 
4. Method of Execution 
Finally, I compare the average method of execution between the groups. 
During this period, most executions were performed by electrocution or le­
thal injection. Other studies have found that electrocution deters more 
people than lethal injection.s3 Although deterrent states appear to have used 
electrocution more frequently than other states, the difference between the 
means is not statistically significant. 
80. Regression results from another project I am working on suggest that the more publicity 
each execution receives, the greater the deterrent effect. 
8 1 .  See supra note 5 8  and accompanying text fo r  a description of the publicity measure. 
82. See Joanna M.  Shepherd, Executions, Deterrence, and the Characteristics of the Person 
Executed (2005) (unpublished regressions) (on file with author). The full theoretical explanation of 
these results is beyond the scope of this paper. The varying deterrent effects for executions of 
different types of criminals is probably caused by both the publicity surrounding the different types 
of criminals and by how similar potential criminals think they are to the executed criminal. 
83. Zimmerman, Alternative Execution Methods, supra note 40. 
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5. The Threshold Effect 
Of the four factors, the only characteristics that vary significantly be­
tween deterrent states and nondeterrent states are the total number of 
executions performed in the state and the total number of death row sen­
tences imposed in the state. Not only is the overall deterrent effect larger 
with a greater number of executions or death row sentences, the deterrent 
effect per execution is also larger. 
The summary statistics are our initial indication that deterrence is sub­
ject to a threshold effect. On average, executions begin to deter murders 
only after some threshold number of executions has been performed. Until a 
state executes that number, its executions either have no effect on the num­
ber of murders or are counterproductive, causing a brutalization effect that 
increases murders. 
Other differences among states may also be important in determining 
whether a state experiences a deterrent effect. Most of these, however, are 
impossible to measure. Possible important differences include, among oth­
ers, racist application of the death penalty, how prosecutors' charging 
decisions are made, and the manner in which authorities determine when or 
if to execute a condemned prisoner. 
B. Regression Results 
I perform additional regressions to explore the threshold effect in more 
detail . First, I perform a spline regression to examine how the relationship 
between murders and executions changes as a state's total number of execu­
tions increases. Then, I perform a dummy-variable regression to examine 
the effect on murder rates of conducting executions when states are below 
the threshold compared to above the threshold. 84 
1 .  Spline Regression 
A spline regression is a statistical method for determining whether there 
is a structural change, or threshold, in the relationship between two vari­
ables. 85 My summary statistics have suggested that states may experience a 
brutalization effect as they begin to perform executions, but at some thresh­
old level of executions, a deterrent effect emerges. Spline regressions can 
test for such knots or thresholds in the murder rate as a state's total number 
of executions increases. The regressions can explore whether the direction 
of capital punishment's effect on murder depends on how many executions a 
state has performed. 
The system of equations is similar to the system I used to estimate sepa­
rate deterrent effects for individual states. Indeed, all variables are defined 
84. Unreported regressions exploring the relationship between murder and the number of 
executions per prisoner yield similar results to those reported below. 
85. See GREENE, supra note 69, at 237. 
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as before, except that the death row sentence and execution variables are 
replaced with a variable, ;,,, that measures the number of executions when 
states are below the threshold number and the number when they are above 
the threshold. The system of equations I estimate is: 
I test for a threshold at nine total executions since 1977. The summary 
statistics suggest that the threshold may occur at approximately this number; 
a threshold of nine executions is above the mean total number for brutaliza­
tion states but below the median total number for deterrent states. My 
regression will test for the existence of this threshold by measuring the ef­
fect on murder rates of additional executions when states have performed 
less than nine executions since 1 977 versus when they have performed nine 
or more executions since 1977. 
The results of the spline regression are reported in the first column of 
Table 3.  I report both the coefficients and the t-statistics for the variable 
measuring the number of below-threshold executions and for the variable 
measuring the number of above-threshold executions. The coefficients rep­
resent the slope of the relationship between the total number of executions 
performed before that date and murder rate. 
TABLE 3 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
SINCE 1977 AND MURDER RATES 
Variables Coefficients!T-statistics 
Dummy-Variable 
Spline Regression Regression 
Below-the-Threshold States: States .05 .28 
with 1 -8  Executions 1 .99* 3.68* 
Above-the-Threshold States: States -.04 -1 .23 
with 9 or More Executions 1 0.52* 1 0.51 * 
The results suggest that below-threshold executions have a brutalization 
effect and above-threshold executions have a deterrent effect. The statisti­
cally significant, positive coefficient for the below-threshold variable 
indicates that, when states have conducted fewer than nine executions, each 
execution increases the murder rate. The statistically significant, negative 
coefficient for the above-threshold variable indicates that, when states have 
performed nine or more executions, each execution decreases the murder 
rate. 
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I also test other numbers, instead of nine, as the possible threshold level. 
Although I do not report the coefficients from all of these regressions, the 
results indicate that the threshold number is somewhere between six and 
eleven executions. Thresholds between six and eleven produce statistically 
significant coefficients that are similar in magnitude to the coefficients when 
nine is treated the threshold level; thresholds below six and above eleven 
produce statistically insignificant results. Thus, the exact threshold is likely 
state-specific; it will vary between six and eleven depending on the state's 
characteristics. 
2. Dummy-Variable Regressions 
I also perform dummy-variable regressions to test the presence of a 
threshold effect. Whereas the spline regression estimates the change in mur­
der rates with each additional execution when the state's total number of 
executions is below versus above the threshold, a dummy-variable regres­
sion estimates the effect on murder rates of simply being a below-threshold 
state versus an above-threshold state. That is, a spline regression answers the 
question: What is the effect on murder rates of performing one more execu­
tion if a state has performed fewer than nine (or other possible threshold) 
executions? A dummy-variable regression answers the question: What is the 
effect on murder rates of having performed fewer than nine executions? 
The dummy-variable regression will estimate a system of equations 
similar to the spline regression's system of equations: 
(8) 
where BT stands for "below the threshold" and takes values of one if a 
state has performed from one to eight executions between 1977 and the year 
in question, and zero otherwise. The variable AT stands for "above the 
threshold" and takes values of one if a state has performed nine or more 
executions between 1 977 and the year in question, and zero otherwise. The 
coefficient on BT is the difference in murder rates between states that have 
performed between one and nine executions and states that either have per­
formed no executions or nine or more executions. The coefficient on AT is 
the difference in murder rates between states that have performed between 
one and nine executions and states that have performed either no executions 
or fewer than nine executions. 
The results of the dummy-variable regression are reported in the second 
column of Table 3. The statistically significant, positive coefficient on the 
below-the-threshold variable indicates that executions have a brutalization 
effect when states have performed fewer than the nine executions. The sta­
tistically significant, negative coefficient on the above-the-threshold variable 
indicates that executions have a deterrent effect when states have performed 
nine or more executions. 
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The results of the summary statistics, spline regression, and dummy­
variable regressions are consistent in finding a threshold effect. As states 
begin to perform executions, the first executions do not deter crime. Instead, 
they either have no statistically significant effect on the murder rate, or the 
executions have a brutalization effect, increasing murders. However, when 
the number of executions reaches a threshold level of nine or so over the 
past twenty years, additional executions begin to have a deterrent effect and 
murder rates decrease. 
My finding of a brutalization effect of executions in states with few exe­
cutions confirms empirically what some scholars have predicted 
theoretically. It has been theorized that executions might increase murder, 
not deter them, and that the brutalization effect is the consequence of the 
beastly example that executions present. 86 Executions devalue human life 
and "demonstrate that it is correct and appropriate to kill those who have 
gravely offended us."87 Thus, the lesson taught by capital punishment may 
be "the legitimacy of lethal vengeance, not of deterrence."88 
My results suggest that a substantial brutalization effect is generally pre­
sent after an execution, regardless how many executions the state has 
already conducted recently. 
Figure 3 provides a way of understanding this. As shown in Figure 3 's 
marginal brutalization curve, regardless of how many executions a state has 
already conducted, an additional execution has a tendency to increase mur­
ders substantially. 
86. CESARE BECCARIA, OF CRIMES AND PuNISHMENTS 50 (H. Paolucci trans., 1 964) ( 1764). 
87. William J. Bowers & Glenn Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: What is the Effect of 
Executions?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 453, 456 ( 1980). 
88. Cochran et al., supra note 46, at 1 10. 
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My results suggest that the additional, marginal brutalization effect of an 
additional execution decreases as a state commits more executions. Accord­
ing to the results, the brutalization effect of a state's first execution can be 
large. For example, the results show that the single execution that Oregon 
conducted induced approximately 175 murders. So it appears that the first 
state-sponsored killing can induce many private copycat killings. Additional 
executions, however, appear not to add as much as the first execution to the 
state's environment of violence. Thus, Figure 3's marginal brutalization 
curve slopes down from left to right. 89 
Executions also create a countervailing effect. Each additional execution 
increases the projected probability, in potential criminal minds, that murder 
will result in execution. Thus, in Figure 3, the curve for the deterrent effect 
slopes up from left to right: the more executions that a state has already 
conducted, the more that each additional execution deters. When a state 
conducts more executions, potential criminals begin to realize that execution 
could possibly be imposed on them. With increasing numbers of executions, 
criminals begin to change their behavior; they commit fewer murders to 
avoid the risk of execution. For example, in Texas, each execution deters 
many murders because the state's many other executions have demonstrated 
to potential criminals that it will execute people who murder. In contrast, in 
89. The brutalization curve may also be flat in some jurisdictions. The marginal brutalization 
effect would still be eventually outweighed by the marginal deterrent effect. 
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a state that has executed only a single person in the last twenty years, crimi­
nals may remain unconvinced that the state has the fortitude to execute more 
people. 
My results suggest that the brutalization effect initially outweighs the 
deterrent effect. As Figure 3 shows, until a state conducts approximately 
nine executions, each execution's tendency to breed brutality and violence 
outweighs the execution's tendency to deter it; until nine executions, the 
brutalization curve is above the deterrence curve. However, in a state with 
more than nine executions, each additional execution's growing deterrent 
effect finally exceeds the brutalization effect. After a state conducts a num­
ber of executions that exceeds the threshold, some people may still be 
induced to kill by an execution. The number of murders eliminated through 
deterrence, however, now exceeds the number caused by brutalization. 
There could be other, unmeasured factors that determine whether states 
experience deterrence, no effect, or brutalization. This is suggested by the 
fact that not all states that have performed many executions experience de­
terrence and not all states that have performed few executions experience 
brutalization. My statistically significant empirical results, however, indicate 
that the number of executions a state has performed is a fundamental deter­
minant of capital punishment's effect in the state. 
v. OTHER MODELS 
To confirm the different impacts across states, I test the individual ef­
fects of capital punishment among states using two other data sets. The data 
sets include a monthly, state-level data set from 1 977 to 1 999, and an an­
nual, state-level data set from 1 960 to 2000. I have used these exact data sets 
in my other studies of capital punishment's deterrent effect and other capital 
punishment researchers have used similar data sets. I am now, for the first 
time, using the data to estimate separate deterrent effects for individual 
states. 
We should expect some differences among the data sets in the states that 
fall into each group: deterrent, no effect, and brutalization. In some states 
where the increase or decrease in murders after an execution is short-lived, 
the monthly data may pick up a statistically significant deterrent or brutali­
zation effect that the annual data did not. Conversely, in some states where 
there are important demographic, economic, or jurisdictional differences 
among counties, the county-level data may pick up a statistically significant 
effect that state-level data did not. The varying time periods of the data sets 
may also result in differences if states experienced deterrence or brutaliza­
tion during some years, but not others. Nevertheless, the results from the 
other data sets can support the primary data set's evidence that capital pun­
ishment has different impacts in different states. 
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A. State-Level Monthly Data: 1977-1999 
First, I estimate different effects of capital punishment among states us­
ing monthly data on homicides, executions, and other variables at the state 
level over the period 1977-1999. I used this data set in another recently pub­
lished study in The Journal of Legal Studies. Because the data and models 
were peer reviewed for the journal, I will use the same data, variables, and 
models augmented to measure individual state effects. 
Analyzing monthly data has a potential advantage over annual data be­
cause it allows me to observe brief fluctuations in murder rates after 
executions; however, the monthly data is at the state level, so I cannot con­
trol for the demographic, economic, and jurisdictional differences among 
U.S. counties that can affect murder rates. 
My state-level, monthly data set includes variables similar to the pri­
mary data set already discussed. It includes data on murders, executions, 
death penalty sentences, per capita income, unemployment rates, and several 
demographic characteristics. The only important difference is that the 
monthly data set does not include arrests for murder because this variable is 
not collected monthly. 
m
i.t = fJpETER;,, + {J2ECON;,, + {J3DEM0;,1 + /J4s; + /J5Y, + fJ6m, + £;,, (9) 
n;,, 
where min is the murder rate (murders/100,000 population) in state i in 
month t. 
The variable DETER stands for the vector of deterrence variables: the 
probability of a death row sentence and the probability of execution. The 
probability of a death row sentence in a given month is defined as a moving 
average of the number of death row sentences in the current and previous 
eleven months divided by a similar twelve-month moving average of the 
number of murders. The probability of execution is defined as a twelve­
month moving average of the number of executions divided by a twelve­
month moving average of the number of people on death row. Although in 
the original publication I used one execution variable to estimate the average 
deterrent effect across all executions in all states, I now use fifty execution 
variables that estimate the deterrent effect separately for each state. 
The variable ECON is a vector of economic variables: the real per capita 
monthly income in the state and the monthly unemployment rate in the 
state. The variable DEMO is a vector of demographic variables: the percent­
age of the county population that is between ten and twenty-nine years of 
age, the percentage of the county population that is male, the percentage of 
the county population that is African American, and the percentage of the 
county population that is some minority group other than African American. 
The variable y is a series of year dummies, the variable m is a series of 
monthly dummies, and the variable s is a series of state dummy variables. 
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I estimate equation (9) using a weighted least-squares regression with 
fixed effects.9° Fixed effects estimation can control for the unobservable het­
erogeneity arising from state-specific attributes that could otherwise result 
in biased estimation. 
The results of the regression suggest that capital punishment's effect var­
ies across states. In the monthly, state-level data, capital punishment has a 
statistically significant deterrent effect in six states, no effect in fifteen 
states, and a statistically significant brutalization effect in eight states (see 
Table 4).91 Although there are some differences in the states in each cate­
gory, thirteen states remain in the same category as in the primary, county­
level data. 
TABLE 4 
STATE-LEVEL MONTHLY DATA: 1977-1999: 
DIFFERING IMPACTS AMONG STATES AND TOTAL 





States with Deterrent States 
States with States with No Brutalization and Other 
Deterrent Effect Effect Effect States 
States in Alabama, Delaware, Arizona, 
Each Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Arkansas, 
Category Kentucky, Illinois, California, 
Louisiana, South Mississippi, Georgia, 
Carolina, Texas Missouri, Indiana, 
Montana, Maryland, 
Nebraska, North Nevada, 






Total 45 (Mean) 1 7.9 1 1 .4 1 .92+ 
Number of 21 .5 (Median) 1 0  7.5 
Executions 
Moreover, the differences between the categories' total number of exe­
cutions are similar to the primary, county-level results. As Table 4 reveals, 
the states with deterrent effects have a substantially higher average and me-
90. The weight is the square root of the state population to correct the heteroskedasticity of 
the error term. 
9 1 .  These states were significant at the 90% confidence level . 
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dian total number of executions. Mean comparison tests indicate that the 
average total number of executions is statistically different among the 
groups at the six percent level. This evidence supports my threshold effect 
hypothesis. 
B .  State-Level Annual Data: 1960-2000 
I also estimate capital punishment's differing impacts across states using 
a state-level, annual data set from 1960 to 2000. State-level, annual data has 
been used in numerous capital punishment studies. I have used the exact 
data used here in a recent paper, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punish­
ment: Evidence from a Judicial Experiment.92 
This state-level, annual data set is more aggregated in both the time and 
geographic dimension than monthly or county data. Thus, some effects that 
were apparent in data that could either measure short-term, monthly changes 
in murder rates or control for county-level jurisdictional differences may not 
be statistically significant in more aggregated data. However, this data cov­
ers a much longer time period than the other data sets. In fact, mine is the 
only data set in the capital punishment literature that has data from before, 
during, and after the Supreme Court moratorium in the 1 970s. Thus, this 
data set may be more likely to pick up effects that lasted for only a few 
years, instead of the entire time period. 
Once again, I estimate one of the primary models from my original 
study using this data. However, instead of estimating the average deterrent 
effect across all executions in all states, I now use fifty execution variables 
that estimate the deterrent effect separately for each state. The regression 
equation is: 
m,,, ( 1 0) 
- = /3, EXEC,_, + /32 ECON,,, + /33DEMO,,, + /34 POLICE + /3, s, + /36y, + t:,,, 
n;,1 
where min is the murder rate (murders/1 00,000 population) in state i in 
year t. 
The deterrent variable is the number of executions in each state. The 
economic variables (ECON) include real per capita personal income and the 
unemployment rate. The demographic variables (DEMO) are the percent­
ages of population age fifteen to nineteen, age twenty to twenty-four, and 
belonging to a minority group. 
Once again, the only important difference in the included variables be­
tween this model and the primary model on county-level data is the arrest 
rate; state-level murder arrests are not available for many years in this longer 
time period. This model, however, does include full-time state police em­
ployees (POLICE) as a nonpunishment deterrent factor; enhanced police 
presence may increase detection and apprehension, deterring some criminal 
activities. 
92. Dezhbakhsh & Shepherd, supra note 37, at 1 3-20. 
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Other controls include state indicators (s) that capture unobservable dif­
ferences among states that are constant through time. Year indicators (y) 
capture long-term national trends in crime. 
I estimate equation ( 10) using a least-squares regression with state-fixed 
effects that is weighted to correct the heteroskedasticity of the error term. 
The results for the different states are in Table 5 .  In the annual, state-level 
data, capital punishment has a statistically significant deterrent effect in five 
states, a statistically significant brutalization effect in six states, and no ef­
fect in twenty-five states.93 Ten of the states remain in the same category as 
in the primary, county-level regressions. 
State-Level, 
Annual Data 
from 1 960-2000 
Total Number of 
Executions 
TABLE 5 
STATE-LEVEL ANNUAL DATA: 1 960-2000: 
DIFFERING IMPACTS AMONG STATES AND 
TOTAL NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS 
States with 
States with States with No Brutalization 
Deterrent Effect Effect Effect 
Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, 
Florida, California, Colorado, 
Georgia, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Delaware, Iowa, Missouri, 

















81 .8 (Mean) 1 4.3 1 8.5 
37 (Median) 5.5 1 1  
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Again, there is strong evidence for a threshold effect. Both the mean and 
median total number of executions is substantially higher for the states with 
a deterrent effect. Mean comparison tests confirm this; the average total 
number of executions is statistically different among the groups at the five 
percent level. 
As we expected because of the different characteristics of the data, there 
are some differences between the states in each category among the three 
data sets. Nevertheless, all three data sets confirm that the impact of capital 
punishment differs significantly among states. Moreover, there is strong 
evidence of a threshold effect in all three data sets. 
CONCLUSION 
Using a large data set of all U.S. counties from 1977 to 1996, I have ex­
amined whether capital punishment's impact on murder rates differs among 
states. The results are striking. Of the twenty-seven states in which at least 
one execution occurred during the sample period, capital punishment deters 
murder in only six states. In contrast, in thirteen states, or more than twice 
as many, capital punishment actually increases murder. In eight states, capi­
tal punishment has no effect on the murder rate. Equivalently, in only 
twenty-two percent of states did executions have a deterrent effect. In con­
trast, executions induced additional murders in forty-eight percent of states. 
Executions created no deterrence in seventy-eight percent of states. These 
results are generally robust in models using data from other time periods 
and state-level data. 
The paper then explored the threshold effect that explains why a few 
states have deterrence but many more others have just the opposite. On av­
erage, the states where capital punishment deters murder execute many 
more people than do the states where capital punishment does not deter 
murder. I show that a threshold number of executions exists, which is ap­
proximately nine executions during the sample period. In states that 
conducted more executions than the threshold, each execution, on average, 
deterred murder. In states that conducted fewer executions than the thresh­
old, the executions, on average, increased the murder rate. 
Perhaps each execution contributes to brutalizing the society and in­
creasing murder. However, if a state executes many people, then criminals 
become convinced that the state is serious about the punishment, and the 
criminals start to reduce their criminal activity. When the number of execu­
tions exceeds the threshold, the deterrence effect begins to outweigh the 
brutalization effect. 
The results suggest that earlier economic papers' focus on national aver­
ages masked variation among states. When the large number of executions 
in the deterrence states are averaged in with the small number of executions 
in all of the other states, the large deterrent effect in the deterrence states 
dominates the opposite brutalization effect in the other states. Thus the re­
sult from earlier economics papers: on average, an execution in the United 
States deters crime. However, this Article shows that these averages are 
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powered by a handful of high-execution, high-deterrence states. In most 
states, capital punishment either increases murder or has no effect. The re­
sults also explain the findings of no deterrence in papers that have focused 
on individual states, rather than on the nation as a whole. As the results here 
show, in a large majority of states, executioas do not deter murder. 
My results have three important policy implications. First, if deterrence 
is the objective, then capital punishment generally succeeds in the few states 
with many executions. Second, the many states with numbers of executions 
below the threshold may be executing people needlessly. Indeed, instead of 
deterring crime, the executions may be inducing additional murders: a rough 
total estimate is that, in the many states where executions induce murders 
rather than deter them, executions cause an additional 250 murders per year. 
Third, to achieve deterrence, states must generally execute many people. If a 
state is unwilling to establish such a large execution program, it should con­
sider abandoning capital punishment. 
A final word of caution is appropriate. This Article's central results are 
consistent across many different models and data sets, showing conclusively 
that capital punishment's impact differs widely among the states; however, 
the results cannot yet offer definitive conclusions about the degree to which 
capital punishment deters or induces murders in a specific state. That awaits 
further work. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX I 
CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY THE DEATH PENALTY, BY STATE 
Alabama Intentional murder with 1 8  aggravating factors. 
Arizona First-degree murder accompanied by at least 1 of 1 0  aggravating factors. 
Arkansas Capital murder with a finding of at least 1 of 1 O aggravating circumstances; 
treason. 
California First-degree murder with special circumstances; train wrecking; treason; 
perjury causing execution. 
Colorado First-degree murder with at least 1 of 1 5  aaaravatina factors; treason. 
Connecticut Capital felony with 8 forms of aaaravated homicide. 
Delaware First-degree murder with aaaravatina circumstances. 
Florida First-degree murder; felony murder; capital drug trafficking; capital sexual 
battery. 
Georgia Murder; kidnapping with bodily injury or ransom when the victim dies; 
aircraft hijacking; treason. 
Idaho First-dearee murder with aqgravating factors; aggravated kidnapping. 
Illinois First-degree murder with 1 of 1 5  aggravating circumstances. 
Indiana Murder with 1 6  aggravating circumstances. 
Kansas Capital murder with 7 aggravating circumstances. 
Kentucky Murder with aggravating factors; kidnapping with aggravating factors. 
Louisiana First-degree murder; aggravated rape of victim under age 1 2; treason. 
Maryland First-degree murder, either premeditated or during the commission of a 
felony, provided that certain death eliaibilitv requirements are satisfied. 
Mississippi Capital murder; aircraft piracy. 
Missouri First-degree murder. 
Montana Capital murder with 1 of 9 aggravating circumstances; capital sexual 
assault. 
Nebraska First-degree murder with a finding of at least 1 statutorily-defined 
aggravating circumstance. 
Nevada First-degree murder with at least 1 of 14 aaaravating circumstances. 
New Hampshire Six categories of capital murder. 
New Jersey Knowing/purposeful murder by one's own conduct; contract murder; 
solicitation by command or threat in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy. 
New Mexico First-degree murder with at least 1 of 7 statutorily-defined aggravating 
circumstances. 
New York First-degree murder with 1 of 1 2  aggravating factors. (Note: On June 24, 
2004, the New York death penalty statute was ruled unconstitutional.) 
North Carolina First-dearee murder. 
Ohio Aaaravated murder with at least 1 of 9 aaaravatina circumstances. 
Oklahoma First-degree murder in conjunction with a finding of at least 1 of 8 statutorily 
defined aggravating circumstances. 
Oregon Aggravated murder. 
Pennsylvania First-degree murder with 1 8  aggravating circumstances. 
South Carolina Murder with 1 of 10 aaaravatina circumstances. 
South Dakota First-dearee murder with 1 of 1 O aaaravating circumstances; aaaravated 
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APPENDIX 2 
METHODS OF EXECUTION BY STATE 
Alabama 
Effective 7/1/02, lethal injection will be administered unless the inmate 
requests electrocution. 
Arizona 
Authorizes lethal injection for persons sentenced after 1 1/1 5/92; those 
sentenced before that date may select lethal injection or lethal gas. 
Authorizes lethal injection for persons committing a capital offense after 
Arkansas 7/4/83; those who committed the offense before that date may select lethal 
injection or electrocution. 
California 
Provides that lethal injection be administered unless the inmate requests 
lethal oas. 
Colorado Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Connecticut Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Lethal Injection is the sole method. Hanging was an alternative for those 
Delaware 
whose offense occurred prior to 6/1 3/86, but as of July 2003 no inmates on 
death row were eligible to choose this alternative and Delaware dismantled 
its gallows. 
Florida Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution 
Lethal injection is the sole method. (On October 5, 2001 , the Georgia 
Georgia Supreme Court held that the electric chair was cruel and unusual 
I punishment and struck down the state's use of the method) 
Idaho Authorizes firing squad only if lethal injection is "impractical". 
I l l inois 
Lethal injection is the state's method. However, it authorizes electrocution if 
lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional. 
Indiana Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Kansas Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Authorizes lethal injection for those convicted after March 3 1 ,  1 998; those 
Kentucky who committed the offense before that date may select lethal injection or 
electrocution 
Louisiana Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Authorizes lethal injection for those whose capital offenses occurred on or 
Maryland after 3/25/94; those who committed the offense before that date may select 
lethal injection or lethal gas. 
Mississippi Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Authorizes lethal injection or lethal gas; the statute leaves unclear who 
Missouri decides what method to use, the inmate or the Director of the Missouri 
Department of Corrections. 
Montana Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Nebraska Electrocution is the sole method. 
Nevada Lethal injection is the sole method. 
New Hampshire Authorizes hanging only if lethal injection cannot be given. 
New Jersey Lethal injection is the sole method. 
New Mexico Lethal injection is the sole method. 
New York Lethal injection is the sole method. 
252 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:203 
North Carolina Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Ohio Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Authorizes electrocution if lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional 
Oklahoma and firing squad if both lethal injection and electrocution are held 
unconstitutional. 
Oregon Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Pennsylvania Lethal injection is the sole method. 
South Carolina Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution 
South Dakota Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Tennessee 
Authorizes lethal injection for those sentenced after Jan. 1 ,  1 999; others 
choose between the electric chair and lethal injection. 
Texas Lethal injection is the sole method. 
Lethal Injection is the sole method of execution. Firing squad was chosen by 
Utah some inmates prior to the passage of legislation banning the practice, and is 
onlv available for those inmates. 
Virginia Allows prisoners to choose between lethal injection and electrocution 
Washington 
Provides that lethal injection be administered unless the inmate requests 
hanoino. 
Wyoming Authorizes lethal gas if lethal injection is ever held to be unconstitutional. 
This table was taken verbatim from DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., METHODS OF EXECUTION, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=245 (last visited Aug. 26, 2005) (updating 
TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1 996, at 5 tbl.3 (1 997), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp96.pdf). 
November 2005] Deterrence versus Brutalization 253 
APPENDIX 3 
AVERAGE PU BLICITY PER EXECUTION, BY STATE: 1997-1 999 
Average Newspaper Average News 
State Name Coverage Transcripts Coverage 
Alabama 5 17  
Arizona 17  41 
Arkansas 21 8 
California 17  1 84 
Colorado 365 424 
Delaware 5 21 
Florida 37 1 43 
Georgia 7 0 
I l l inois 43 47 
Indiana 50 50 
Kentucky 18  60 
Louisiana 1 2  24 
Maryland 80 201 
Missouri 22 35 
Montana 0 1 
Nebraska 32 1 5  
Nevada 23 21 
North Carolina 1 1  31 
Ohio 123 592 
Oklahoma 1 0  26 
Oregon 77 81 
Pennsylvania 0 1 5  
South Carolina 7 6 
Texas 1 0  28 
Utah 44 89 
Virginia 1 4  31 
Washington 71 1 6  
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APPENDIX 4 
INDIVIDUAL STATE EFFECTS OF THE PROBABILITY OF 
EXECUTION ON THE MURDER RATE 
STATE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Alabama 0.05 ·2.50 1 .44 1 .80 -3.22 
0.02 ·2.47 0.66 1 . 12 -4.91 
Arizona 6.92 2.82 8.50 9.43 1 .29 
2.97 1 .56 3.42 4.70 1 .01 
Arkansas 1 0.76 7.60 1 4.74 1 3.26 3.64 
2.60 2.92 2.42 4.10 1 .29 
California 1 2.55 20.32 27.54 1 2.45 ·2.1 2  
4.46 7.73 6.26 4.90 -1 .36 
Delaware - 1 6.23 -8.72 -1 4.67 -1 3.46 ·9.31 
·1 .43 ·1 .62 -1 .50 -2.29 -2.74 
Florida -32.96 -7.66 -39.68 -33.96 ·16.18 
-1 5.96 -6. 1 3  -1 5.90 -19 . 10  -21 .35 
Georgia · 1 0.64 ·1 .39 -9.08 -1 1 .81 -4.38 
-5.76 ·1 .26 -4.29 -7.61 -5.70 
Idaho 1 .95 5.34 1 .66 9 . 13  3.78 
0.45 1 .67 0.43 3.22 1 .97 
Illinois 1 1 .63 ·0.01 27.28 1 5.20 2.72 
3.71 0.00 7.61 6.29 1 .49 
Indiana 9.01 2 . 12  1 1 .26 7.35 0.25 
4.09 1 .71 4.53 4.49 0.32 
Louisiana 22.51 -0.36 39.33 1 8. 1 0  ·1 .09 
8.38 -0.22 10. 1 4  8.49 -0.98 
Maryland 7.14 4.07 1 1 .22 1 2.03 2.76 
2.49 2.05 3.33 5.74 2.14 
Mississippi 0 . 12  2.82 -0.75 2.57 1 .40 
0.05 1 .96 -0.23 1 . 1 9  1 .46 
Missouri -0.81 26.88 3.41 1 .03 4 1 . 1 3  
-0.31 1 0.37 1 . 1 0  0.49 24.25 
Montana 30.62 1 .24 24.08 1 4.64 3.40 
1 .62 0. 1 1  1 .56 1 .90 0.90 
Nebraska 1 1 .03 3.37 ·2.93 2.33 -0.84 
1 .09 0.97 -0.92 0.98 -0.73 
Nevada -1 .56 -7.76 4.58 -5.49 -1 1 .56 
-0.41 -2.45 1 . 1 9  ·1 .81 -5.97 
North Carolina ·2.80 1 .66 ·2.32 0.70 -0.93 
-1 .69 1 .26 -1 .24 0.50 -1 .38 
Oklahoma 8.95 -0.02 9.43 6.67 -1 .03 
4.25 -0.01 4.01 3.98 -1 . 12 
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STATE Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Oregon 10.76 7.09 1 2.85 1 1 .49 5.26 1 5.25 
2.81 1 .84 3.37 4.34 2.48 4.70 
Pennsylvania ·2.62 1 .22 -0.53 4.62 0.99 4.97 
-1 .02 0.81 -0. 1 6  2.33 0.89 1 .96 
South Carolina ·12 . 10 -4.27 • 1 3.49 ·10.16 ·6.24 -1 0.73 
·5.89 -3.48 ·6.09 -6.04 ·9.59 -5.80 
Texas -1 7.68 -2.41 ·1 6.00 -1 7.54 ·9.95 -1 5.28 
-1 6.65 -2.97 ·1 4.87 -1 9.84 ·1 9.1 3 ·17.18 
Utah 9.59 1 2.03 4.24 9.54 9.33 9.23 
2.68 4.55 1 .48 4.28 4.90 3.66 
Virginia 6.84 8.03 7.38 6.52 2.25 8.98 
3.94 8.16 3.81 4.63 3.71 5.91 
Washington 5.56 4.64 1 1 .35 1 1 .90 4.98 1 6.64 
1 .38 1 .76 3.46 5.54 2.81 6.02 
Wyoming 4.86 ·1 4.87 1 .84 2.84 -3.38 6.79 
0.39 -1 .01 0.30 0.71 -1 .24 1 .73 
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